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This thesis examines the historical roots and significance of Turkey‘s decades-long 
struggle with terrorism. It argues that current perceptions of terrorism in Turkey are due 
to historical challenges to the country‘s territorial sovereignty. These challenges are 
rooted in the aborted Treaty of Sèvres at the end of World War I. Framed as a historical 
survey, this thesis concludes that terrorism in Turkey has been perceived as a threat to the 
territorial integrity of the state due to the legacy of territorial loss during the end of the 
Ottoman Empire and the nationalist separatist movements during the early Republican 
period. Although significantly different from early separatist movements, the threats 
posed by the Kurdistan Workers‘ Party (PKK) and the Armenian Secret Army for the 
Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) have been interpreted as an outgrowth of the 
irredentism and imperialism embedded in the Treaty of Sèvres. As Turkey encounters 
new threats from religiously motivated terrorism, policymakers continue to view 
separatist terror as the foremost threat and a continuation of this historical trend. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Terrorism in Turkey has historically been motivated by a complex blend of 
separatism, ideology, and religion. The Turkish counterterrorism apparatus has struggled 
to meet these threats, particularly from the ethnonationalist and separatist Kurdistan 
Workers‘ Party (PKK). Turkish terrorism is viewed as a threat due to the violent attacks 
with Turkish political rhetoric illustrating that perceptions are heavily predisposed toward 
framing terrorism as a challenge to the territorial integrity of the Turkish state. However, 
the relationship between the current perceptions of Turkish terrorism and 
counterterrorism and the transformative years of the Turkish Republic are not extensively 
documented or well understood. Historical contextualization of both the state 
counterterrorism policy and Turkish perceptions on terrorism may help explain Turkish 
views on domestic threats. 
Given that Turkish counterterrorism policy frames domestic ethnonationalist and 
separatist threats as tantamount to encroachments upon Turkey‘s territorial integrity, 
important research questions arise: What are the historical roots of Turkey‘s framing of 
domestic threats? What are the implications of this framing on Turkey‘s ability to 
transcend domestic terrorism? 
B. IMPORTANCE  
Turkey is a geostrategically important country that garners worldwide praise in 
many areas: an emerging economic powerhouse, the second largest army in NATO, and a 
beacon of democratic stability in the Islamic world. Accompanying this global 
recognition, Turkey‘s claims to regional leadership continue to evolve. Turkey‘s foreign 
policy has recently signaled a neo-Ottoman trend that orients toward the non-Western 
world and regional neighbors.1 As an influential state in a volatile region, both academics 
                                                 
1 For a comparative analysis of Kemalist foreign policy and neo-Ottoman foreign policy, see Ömer 
Taşpınar, ―Turkey’s Middle East Policies: Between Neo-Ottomanism and Kemalism,‖ Carnegie Papers 10 
(September 2008): 14-17; ―A New Ottoman Empire?‖ Forbes, June 2, 2009. 
 2 
and policymakers seek to glean tenets of Turkish strategy and policies and translate them 
to other states with seemingly similar experiences.2 However, Turkish foreign policy 
remains aspirational, as many goals have not reach fruition.3 
When surveying Turkey‘s dynamic potential, its decades-long struggle against 
domestic terrorism assumes great significance. While the PKK is Turkey‘s most 
infamous domestic terrorist group, many others have operated on Turkish territory.4 
Decades of counterterrorism policies and recent political solutions have yet to quell the 
terrorist threat within Turkey. Terrorism remains a source of violence and continues to 
undermine outside perceptions of the country‘s commitments to civil rights (thus 
hindering Ankara‘s accession to the European Union). Furthermore, the Turkish struggle 
to combat these groups has stymied its regional authority and undermined Ankara‘s 
―Zero Problems with our Neighbors‖ foreign policy.5  
This thesis contextualizes Turkey‘s views on domestic threats in an attempt to 
highlight how the current counterterrorism perceptions and reactions are informed by the 
historical legacy. It examines the challenges to Turkey‘s territorial sovereignty in order to 
illuminate the way these territorial anxieties undermine foreign policy interactions and to 
expose additional options for combating and pacifying terrorism within its borders. 
Lastly, it offers an overarching historical analysis of terrorism and provides insights into 
the fluctuating developments on religiously-motivated terrorism within Turkey and on its 
borders.  
                                                 
2 After the 2011 Arab Spring, there was a wave of literature hailing Turkey as a ―model‖ for Arab 
democracy.  For further commentary, see Emel Parlar Dal, ―The Transformation of Turkey‘s Relations with 
the Middle East: Illusion or Awakening?‖ Turkish Studies 13, no. 2 (2012): 245-267; Philip Robins, 
―Turkey‘s ‗double gravity‘ predicament: the foreign policy of a newly activist power,‖ International Affairs 
89, no. 2 (March 2013): 381-397; Stathis N. Kalyvas, ―The ‗Turkish Model‘ in the Matrix of Political 
Catholicism,‖ in Democracy, Islam, &Secularism in Turkey, eds. Ahmet T. Kuru and Alfred Stepan (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 189-192. 
3 Sinan Ülgen, ―From Inspiration to Aspiration: Turkey in the New Middle East,‖ (Washington, DC: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 2011). 
4 Other groups include the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), the 
Revolutionary People‘s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C), Kurdish Hizbollah, the Great Eastern Islamic 
Raiders‘ Front (İBDA-C), and al-Qaeda. 
5 Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ―Policy of Zero Problems with our Neighbors,‖ 
accessed August 22, 2014, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/policy-of-zero-problems-with-our-neighbors.en.mfa; 
Ahmet Davutoğlu, ―Turkey‘s Zero-Problems Foreign Policy,‖ Foreign Policy, May 20, 2010. 
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C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Understanding the challenges to Turkish sovereignty is a critical element to any 
study of Turkish approaches to and perceptions of terrorism. This thesis aims to 
determine the most influential variable impacting the historical roots of the territorial 
insecurities in counterterrorism policy and concludes that the terms and legacy of the 
Treaty of Sèvres is most important in the way Turkey frames domestic threats as a danger 
to its territorial integrity. Decades after the abrogation of the treaty, the proposed terms 
continue to impact the evolution of the Turkish national consciousness and the 
development of its security framework.6 In Turkey‘s quest to transcend domestic 
terrorism, the thesis takes into account the implications of this view on Turkish foreign 
policy relations and future challenges for Turkish counterterrorism policy, tactics, and 
priorities.  
1. Counterterrorism Strategies 
Primarily, the research addresses the implications of the historical dimension on 
past, current, and future approaches to counterterrorism in Turkey. Turkey‘s territorial 
anxieties have informed perspectives on terrorism since the establishment of the Turkish 
Republic. Although separatist violence dates back to the early Republican period, the 
Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) is the first modern 
separatist organization studied.7 In the initial wave of PKK terror in the late 1980s, Prime 
Minister Turgut Özal viewed terrorism as part of foreign conspiracies from Iraq and Iran 
to undermine Turkish authority.8 To combat this separatist menace, Turkey has employed 
a ―whole of government‖ approach with diplomatic, economic, and cultural strategies. 
Despite the broad span of policies employed, the primary tool to fight terrorism has been 
                                                 
6 Dietrich Jung, ―The Sèvres Syndrome: Turkish Foreign Policy and its Historical Legacies,‖ 
http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives_roll/2003_07- 09/jung_Sèvres/jung_Sèvres.html. 
7 Separatist violence existed in the early years of the Turkish Republic. One example is Xoybûn, the 
Kurdish nationalist organization that sought an independent Kurdish state. Xoybûn was responsible for 
launching the Ağrı Rebellion from 1927 until 1930, and it was subsequently crushed by the Turkish 
military.  For more information, see Söner Cağaptay, Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern 
Turkey: Who is a Turk? (New York: Routledge, 2006), 38-39; Celadet Alî Bedirxan, ―The Kurdish 
Question, its Origins and Causes,‖ in Modernism: Representations of National Culture, eds. Ahmet Ersoy, 
Maciej Górny, and Vangelis Kechriotis (New York: CEU Press, 2010), 343-350. 
8 ―Turkish Prime Minister on Terrorist Incidents in Anatolia,‖ BBC, October 19, 1984. 
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raw military force.9 Instead of viewing ASALA and the PKK within the context of 
nationalism and advocacy for cultural rights, any concessions or autonomy allowed to 
ethnic minorities is viewed as weakening Turkish territorial integrity.  
Quite different from the PKK and ASALA attacks of the last decades of 20th 
century, the beginning of the twenty-first century has seen small-scale attacks loosely 
connected to al-Qaeda and religiously-motivated groups attacking Western targets within 
Turkey. The most significant attacks occurred in November 2003 with truck bombings 
targeting synagogues, the British Consulate (killing the counsel general), and a branch of 
the London-based HSBC Bank.10 Other al-Qaeda attacks succeeded, but the majority of 
attacks were foiled in the planning stages.11 When viewed in the context of its neighbors 
or the larger Middle East, these small-scale attacks could suggest a worrisome trend. 
However, I argue that domestic separatist terrorism is still perceived as the most 
significant threat to Turkey and that Turkey‘s counterterrorism strategy is rooted to a 
large degree in the historical apprehensions crystallized in the signing of the Treaty of 
Sèvres.  
2. Foreign Policy Implications 
Secondarily, I argue that Turkey‘s perception that domestic threats from minority 
groups are territorial challenges undermines Turkish foreign policy priorities. Turkey‘s 
reaction to domestic minority politics manifests in its hypersensitivity to regional or 
nationalist politics. Therefore, aspects of Turkey‘s foreign policy may be influenced by 
its experience with domestic terrorism. Ankara‘s militarized approach toward these issues 
is illustrated by Turkey‘s historic penchant to become involved in unnecessary conflicts 
with its neighbors in the name of protecting its sovereignty. After years of progress, the 
resurgence of PKK attacks and conflicts in Kurdish-populated Iraq and Syria have caused 
                                                 
9 Alan Cowell, ―Turkey Opts for Raw Force in Fight Against Kurds,‖ New York Times, September 7, 
1992; Audrey Kurth Cronin, How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist 
Campaigns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 128-9 
10 Craig S. Smith, ―Explosions in Istanbul Destroy British Consulate and Bank; At Least 27 Killed, 
400 Injured,‖ New York Times, November 20, 2003. 
11 Karen Hodgson, ―The al Qaeda Threat in Turkey,‖ Long War Journal, July 8, 2013. 
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Turkey to forcefully reassert its territorial sovereignty.12 In recent years, Turkish policy 
toward Iran has wavered between cooperation and conflict on Kurdish issues and 
combating the PKK.13 Politicians in Ankara have asserted that Iran supports the PKK 
through tacit acceptance of training camps on its territory and uses the PKK to promote 
its own foreign policy aims.14 These trends indicate the degree to which domestic 
minority politics assumes critical importance to Turkey‘s understanding of its regional 
environment. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The historical roots of Turkey‘s counterterrorism policy are addressed to various 
degrees in a series of different fields: terrorism studies, Ottoman and Republican history, 
and Turkish international relations. While there is an emerging field of literature 
analyzing modern Turkish history and a robust set of literature analyzing all aspects of 
Turkish domestic terrorism, there are few studies that directly link the legacy of the 
Treaty of Sèvres with Turkish counterterrorism policies and explore the implications. 
Furthermore, few sources consider the impact of Turkey's Ottoman past upon its modern 
counterterrorism policies. For the purposes of this thesis, the literature is divided into 
three groups: literature that addresses terrorism and counterterrorism in Turkey, literature 
that considers the importance of the Treaty of Sèvres, and literature that directly deals 
with the manifestations of the Sèvres Syndrome in Turkish foreign policy. 
                                                 
12 ―Turkish jets bomb PKK bases in Iraq,‖ Hürriyet Daily News, August 18, 2011; ―Erdoğan says 
PKK threat from Syria may prompt Turkish military retaliation,‖ Today’s Zaman, July 25, 2012. 
13 For example, in 2010 Turkey and Iran agreed to coordinate on intelligence in order to protect their 
borders.  This cooperation was short-lived and it ended in 2011, coinciding with a strain in relations due to 
the Syrian conflict.  For more information on the history of Turkish-Iranian relations see F. Stephen 
Larrabee and Alireza Nader, ―Turkish-Iranian Relations in a Changing Middle East,‖ RAND National 
Defense Research Institute (2013); Henri J. Barkey, ―Turkish-Iranian Competition after the Arab Spring,‖ 
Survival 54, no. 6 (2012): 139-162; Graham E. Fuller, The New Turkish Republic: Turkey as a Pivotal State 
in the Muslim World (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2008), 107-114. 
14 Stephen J. Flanagan, ―The Turkey-Russia-Iran Nexus: Eurasian Power Dynamics,‖ The Washington 
Quarterly 36, no. 1 (2013): 171; Nur Bilge Criss, ―The nature of PKK terrorism in Turkey,‖ Studies in 
Conflict & Terrorism 18, no. 1 (2008): 30-32. 
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1. Terrorism and Counterterrorism in Turkey 
The existing works on Turkish terrorism narrowly focus on the group objectives 
or state responses to terrorism and make only minor connections to the historical roots of 
Turkish terrorism and counterterrorism. 
It is important to note that the main body of literature on Turkish terrorism almost 
exclusively studies the PKK. A collective survey of secondary research on the PKK 
reveals several major trends. First, the authors tend to approach terrorism from a 
practitioner‘s point of view, undertaking functional topics such as ethnicity, militancy, 
and illicit network funding, and tactics such as suicide terrorism.15 There is also a 
dedicated field of literature analyzing and making recommendations on the end of the 
PKK.16 Since the literature on the PKK is from the topical rather than historical 
perspective, there is a tendency to isolate the variables and not include PKK terrorism 
within the historical continuum of suppressed separatist threats from minorities. 
The overemphasis on Kurdish terrorism means that there is relatively little 
literature on non-ethnic terrorism in Turkey. The literature on groups such as the 
Revolutionary People‘s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C), Kurdish Hizbollah, the Great 
Eastern Islamic Raiders‘ Front (İBDA-C), and al-Qaeda operations in Turkey exists, but 
is limited.17 Contrasted to the literature on the PKK, the literature on leftist and Islamist 
groups overwhelmingly frames terrorism in Turkey in relation to the global war on terror. 
The most authoritative and encompassing work in this field is Andrew Mango‘s Turkey 
                                                 
15 The literature is broad, but see the following articles among others: Andre Barrinha, ―The political 
importance of labeling: terrorism and Turkey‘s discourse on the PKK,‖ Critical Studies on Terrorism 4, no. 
2 (2011); Mitchel P. Roth, et al., ―The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate: Funding 
Terrorism through Organized Crime, A Case Study,‖ Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30, no. 10 (2007); 
Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House 
Publishing Group, 2005), 162-66. 
16 Cengiz Çandar, ―‗Leaving the mountain‘: How may the PKK lay down arms? Freeing the Kurdish 
Question from violence,‖ TESEV Publications (2012). 
17 Anat Kurz and Ariel Merari, ASALA: Irrational Terror or Political Tool, Jaffee Center for Strategic 
Studies (1985); M. Alper Sozer and Murat Sever, ―Violent Extremism in Terrorist Organizations: The Case 
of Turkish Hizbullah,‖ in I.  Bal, S. Ozeren, and M.A. Sozer (eds.), Multi-Faceted Approach to 
Radicalization in Terrorist Organizations, IOS Press (2011); Ian O. Lesser, ―Turkey: ‗Recessed Islamic 
Politics and Convergence with the West,‖ in ―The Muslim World after 9/11,‖ RAND Project Air Force 
(2004): 193-5; Olga Khazan, ―Turkey Bombing: What Is the DHKP/C Terrorist Group?‖ Washington Post, 
February 1, 2013; Hodgson, ―The al Qaeda Threat in Turkey.‖ 
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and the War on Terror: For Forty Years We Fought Alone. This historical work provides 
some background on Islamic-inspired extremists during the Ottoman Empire, with the 
main focus on Turkish counterterrorism strategies within the context of the global war on 
terror. Mango argues that although Turkey has been the target of terrorism since the 
1960s, the global war on terror provided the international community an opportunity to 
engage Turkey in worldwide efforts to combat terrorism. The disinterest of the West, 
however, allowed Turkey to pursue its own distorted perceptions of counterterrorism with 
few checks.18 
Within the general literature on counterterrorism, analysis of Turkish 
counterterrorism policies typically falls into two camps. Some studies focus upon the 
political motivations and goals of the terrorists in order to better inform counterterrorism 
strategies.19 Other studies focus on the effectiveness of the government‘s responses, 
behavior, and policies toward the terrorist group—a body of literature that has grown 
since 2001.20 Mustafa Coşar Ünal‘s research, to take one example, bridges both 
tendencies. His work contends with the effectiveness of Turkish counterterrorism policies 
and argues that repressive techniques, although favored by states, tend to be the least 
effective. Instead, he contends that policies that address the legitimate grievances of the 
terrorists will instead garner public support and undermine the terrorists.21 
For the purposes of this study, the literature on separatist and ethnonationalist 
terrorism provides context for threats to Turkey‘s territorial sovereignty. Although the 
PKK has Marxist-Leninist roots, it is perceived by the Turkish government to be a 
separatist and nationalist group. Since much of the literature does not differentiate 
                                                 
18 Andrew Mango, Turkey and the War on Terror: For Forty Years We Fought Alone (New York: 
Routledge, 2005). 
19 Max Abrahms, ―What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy,‖ 
International Security 32, no. 4 (Spring 2008): 78-105; Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and Eric S.  Dickson, 
―The Propaganda of the Deed: Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Mobilization,‖ American Journal of 
Political Science 51, no. 2 (April 2007): 364-81. 
20 Bruce Hoffman, ―Rethinking terrorism and counterterrorism since 9/11,‖ Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism (2002); Yonah Alexander, ed. Counterterrorism Strategies: Successes and Failures of Six 
Nations (New York: Potomac Books, 2006). 
21 Mustafa Coşar Ünal, Counterterrorism in Turkey: Policy choices and policy effects towards the 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), (New York: Routledge, 2012).   
 8 
between separatist and ethnonationalist groups, this thesis will study them in 
conjunction.22 In his analytical foundation for the study of terrorism, Bruce Hoffman 
groups together ―ethnonationalist/separatist‖ terrorism to include groups such as the 
Basque Homeland and Freedom group (ETA), Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 
Irish Republican Army (IRA), and the PKK. He argues that the ethnonationalist/separatist 
groups decline as nations gain sovereignty, resulting in less credibility for international 
terrorism as a tactic.23 Furthermore, literature on separatist terrorism is typically 
presented from the comparative perspective in order to draw conclusions on group 
motivations or counterterrorism policies.24 
Most relevant for this thesis, there is a small field of literature that discusses 
Turkish terrorism and counterterrorism in a broad historical perspective. This literature 
traces terrorism and counterterrorism back to Ottoman-era domestic insurgent threats, 
mainly from minority groups. Since many of these insurgencies garnered foreign support 
and some resulted in territorial loss, this literature provides a historical basis for studying 
terrorism in Turkey within the context of the challenges to territorial integrity. 
Additionally, the literature highlights how the early experience with separatist groups was 
the catalyst for Ottoman development of counterinsurgency practices and policies that 
can be traced to contemporary counterterrorism policies.25 
Most of the general literature on Turkish terrorism and counterterrorism policy is 
narrow in historical scope and does not directly take the Treaty of Sèvres into account.26 
Instead, the literature highlights the domestic threats and challenges to Turkish 
                                                 
22 Alex P. Schmid, ed., The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research (New York: Routledge, 
2011), 170; 665. 
23 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 85; 230; 268. 
24 Erkin Özlen, ―Comparative Experiences of Three Countries against Separatist Terrorism: Turkey, 
Spain, the UK,‖ Journal of Strategic Studies 1, no. 4 (2009). 
25 Ryan Gingeras, ―The Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization: ‗Oriental‘ Terrorism, 
Counterinsurgency, and the End of the Ottoman Empire,‖ Oxford Handbooks Online (February 2014); 
Edward J. Erickson, Ottomans and Armenians: A Study in Counterinsurgency (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillian, 2013). 
26 Ünal, Counterterrorism in Turkey; Criss, ―The nature of PKK terrorism in Turkey‖; Andrew 
Mango, Turkey and the War on Terror: For Forty Years We Fought Alone (New York: Routledge, 2005); 
Michael M. Gunter, ―Abdullah Ocalan: ‗We are Fighting Turks Everywhere,‘‖ Middle East Quarterly 5, 
no. 2 (June 1998). 
 9 
sovereignty but does not utilize the Treaty of Sèvres as evidence. One example is Audrey 
Kurth Cronin‘s study on the demise of terrorist organizations. She highlights how Turkey 
views PKK terrorism not just in terms of the threat of violence, but also in the historical 
context of external actors interfering in internal affairs. This work focuses on the funding 
and training of the PKK by neighboring states, but does not connect the territorial 
anxieties to the foundation of the Republic and the Treaty of Sèvres.27 Since the literature 
on terrorism does not deal with the Treaty of Sèvres and the Sèvres Syndrome directly, I 
analyze the literature to provide a larger historical context to Turkey‘s territorial anxieties 
and perceptions of terrorism. Repurposing the literature in this way allows me to illustrate 
how the territorial anxieties caused by the Sèvres Syndrome affects the study of terrorism 
in Turkey. 
2. Modern Turkish History and the Treaty of Sèvres 
The perceptions of Turkish terrorism and counterterrorism must be put in context 
of the Turkish historical accounts on territorial sovereignty. Historiography from both the 
Ottoman era and after the foundation of the Turkish Republic is relevant for this study. 
The Ottoman historiography is germane because it provides background material and 
context for the domestic and international issues that led to the creation of the Republic. 
More specifically, the historical literature can be used as a point of reference for the 
issues raised in this thesis including Ankara‘s apprehensions toward foreign interference, 
the contextualization of minority policies—particularly the Kurds—and responses to 
separatism and terrorism.28 
Within the body of Turkish historical literature, the Treaty of Sèvres is at the core 
of studying the territorial anxieties present in modern Turkish history. The Treaty of 
Sèvres was a peace treaty at the end of World War I signed between the Ottoman Sultan 
                                                 
27 Audrey Kurth Cronin, How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist 
Campaigns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 128-29. 
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and the Allied powers on August 10, 1920. The treaty reduced the size of the Ottoman 
Empire to one third of its territory in terms more punitive than those assigned to the 
Germany Empire in the Treaty of Versailles. The revised borders would have reduced the 
Ottoman Empire to a small piece of northern Asia Minor with Istanbul as the capital, 
created an independent Kurdish and Armenian state on Ottoman territory, and partitioned 
the area of Eastern Thrace to Greece. The Treaty of Sèvres was never implemented 
because a group of Turkish nationalists, led by Mustafa Kemal, rejected the treaty 
outright and launched the War of Independence. The victory of Kemal‘s troops led to the 
Allied government‘s recognition of Turkish sovereignty with the implementation of the 
Treaty of Lausanne.29 
While it may seem like a historical nuance, the leading accounts on modern 
Turkish history extensively document the Treaty of Sèvres.30 The literature highlights the 
treaty‘s two main psychological impacts: the way Turks view their territorial integrity 
and the historical interactions with minorities. First, Mustafa Kemal‘s ability to render 
Sèvres obsolete secured his legacy as the protector of Turkish territorial integrity in the 
minds of scholars. The harsh realities of the Treaty of Sèvres map provide a glimpse of 
the counterfactual and serve as an explanation for the way Turks view their territorial 
integrity.31 Moreover, there is wide-ranging consensus in the literature that the leaders of 
the young Republic, policymakers in Turkey, and historians view the Treaty of Sèvres as 
the culmination of the separatist movements plaguing the Ottoman Empire. The literature 
documents the seriousness of separatist threats from minorities during the Ottoman 
Empire, which is relevant to the way Turks interact with minorities.32 
                                                 
29 ―The Treaty of Sèvres, 1920,‖ in The Treaties of Peace 1919-1923, Vol. II, ed. John Reed (New 
York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1924); Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, 147. 
30 Erik J. Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2009); Stanford J. Shaw and 
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31 Helmreich, From Paris to Sèvres, 314-32. 
32 Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, 93-133, Donald Quataert, The Ottoman Empire 1700-1922 
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Furthermore, there is no sweeping or in-depth study of the historical impact of the 
so-called Sèvres Syndrome. Fatma Müge Göçek‘s recent book on the Ottoman legacy in 
modern Turkey faces the Syndrome head-on and that provides an in-depth account of the 
legacy of the Treaty of Sèvres. She also affords the most precise definition of the Sèvres 
Syndrome: the ―Sèvres syndrome refers to those individuals, groups or institutions in 
Turkey who interpret all public interactions—domestic and foreign—through a 
framework of fear and anxiety over the possible annihilation, abandonment or betrayal of 
the Turkish state by the West.‖33 Using an impeccable comparative analysis of the Sèvres 
Syndrome to the dehistoricization and the mythologization, Göçek focuses on the military 
as the key institution carrying the Sèvres Syndrome forward. Although the military plays 
a large role in the counterterrorism policy, a full analysis is outside the scope of this 
thesis. Other evaluations of the Sèvres Syndrome touch on domestic and foreign policy, 
as well analysis on whether Turkey will be able to overcome its Sèvres legacy.34 This 
work provides an important foundation and basis for applications of the Sèvres Syndrome 
to other areas of literature and the questions raised in this thesis. 
3. The Sèvres Syndrome in Turkish Foreign Policy 
In order to study how the Turkish state frames domestic threats from a historical 
perspective, this thesis will consider the literature on the basis and evolution of Turkish 
foreign policy.35 Unlike the historical literature, the foreign policy literature is generally 
based on Kemalist-era foundations rather than Ottoman period trends. Much of the 
                                                 
33 Fatma Müge Göçek, The Transformation of Turkey: Redefining the State and Society from the 
Ottoman Empire to the Modern Era (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 99. 
34 Dietrich Jung, ―The Sèvres Syndrome: Turkish Foreign Policy and its Historical Legacies,‖ 
http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives_roll/2003_07- 09/jung_Sèvres/jung_Sèvres.html; Levon 
Hovsepyan, ―The Fears of Turkey: The Sèvres Syndrome,‖ Information and Public Relation Center (2012); 
Michelangelo Guida, ―The Sèvres Syndrome and ‗Komplo‘ Theories in the Islamist and Secular Press,‖ 
Turkish Studies 9, no. 1 (2008). 
35 For an overview of literature on Turkish foreign policy, see William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy, 
1774-2000 Third Edition (New York: Routledge, 2012); Fuller, The New Turkish Republic; Philip Robins, 
Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
2003); Michael S. Radu, ed., Dangerous Neighborhood: Contemporary Issues in Turkey’s Foreign 
Relations (New Brunswick: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2003); Söner Cağaptay, The Rise of Turkey: 
The Twenty-First Century’s First Muslim Power (New York: University of Nebraska Press, 2014).  For 
official statements on Turkish foreign policy, see the Republic of Turkey‘s Ministry of Foreign Affairs at 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/default.en.mfa.   
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literature concludes that Turkey acts as a ―realist‖ state in its narrow view of national 
security. Unfortunately, the literature lacks the necessary international relations 
comparative and theoretical analysis.36 This truncated and compartmentalized view of 
foreign policy provides a limited scope of the historical roots of Turkish terrorism.  
At the domestic level, the literature illustrates that Turkish foreign policy tends to 
be a response to the Treaty of Sèvres conditions evident in the post-Ottoman past. 
Turkish policymakers use the treaty‘s conditions to affirm their domestic and 
international beliefs and to justify their policy positions. The literature encapsulates the 
ingrained Turkish hostility and skepticism of power politics, from Turkish neutrality in 
World War II to non-intervention in the 2003 invasion of Iraq.37 Furthermore, 
manifestations of the Sèvres Syndrome are evident in the literature on two main Turkish 
anxieties: fears of Western intervention and fears of intervention from states with Kurdish 
populations.  
First, the literature highlights fears of Western intervention, particularly from 
European states with Kurdish diasporas. Many policymakers respond to the 
institutionalized fear that domestic struggles are the product of foreign complicity and a 
conspiracy of powerful states to violate Turkey‘s territorial sovereignty. In one work, 
Emrullah Uslu and Onder Aytac highlight how the legacy of the Treaty of Sèvres 
influences Ankara‘s perception of EU support for Kurdish political and cultural rights. 
The legacy has affected Turkish relations with European states, with some Turkish 
intellectuals and policymakers believing that the European Union (EU) supports Kurdish 
                                                 
36 For realist interpretations, see Ebru Canan-Sokullu, ed. Debating Security in Turkey: Challenges 
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rights. One example is the belief that a pro-PKK TV channel broadcast from England was 
part of a larger plot to dismember Turkey.38  
In regard to the literature on regional intervention from states with Kurdish 
populations, the focus rests on Kurdish self-determination and the claims of neighboring 
states on Turkish territory.39 Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East is influenced by 
the perception of being ―encircled by enemies‖ as part of a foreign conspiracy that targets 
the territorial integrity of the Turkish state.40 This mentality has influenced its relations 
with neighboring states as the lines between internal and external threats become blurred. 
Turkish relations with states with Kurdish populations—Syria, Iraq, and Iran—vary 
between conflict and cooperation. Turkey sees these states as interfering in their domestic 
affairs through support of the Kurds.41 Commentaries on Turkish foreign policy tend to 
emphasize the Treaty of Sèvres with respect to Kurdish self-determination. The 
autonomous Kurdistan allocated in the Treaty of Sèvres provides the basis for Kurdish 
nationalism to be perceived as the resurrection of the Ottoman Empire‘s territorial 
dismemberment.42 Furthermore, the legacy of Sèvres influences relations with states that 
lay claim to Turkish territory, including Syria‘s continuing claims on Turkey‘s Hatay 
Province.43 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis is a historical analysis that studies the ways in which Turkish 
counterterrorism policy frames domestic terrorism as a challenge to territorial integrity. A 
study of the Turkish experience, views of the Treaty of Sèvres, and the evolution of the 
                                                 
38 Uslu and Aytac, ―War of Paradigms,‖ 129-32.   
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The Journal of Conflict Studies 20, no. 1 (Spring 2000). 
40 Senior Turkish politicians and policymakers have made statements of this nature, see Dietrich Jung, 
―The Sèvres Syndrome: Turkish Foreign Policy and its Historical Legacies.‖ 
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(2008): 30-34. 
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Sèvres Syndrome provides historical contextualization for the evidence of this framing in 
Turkish counterterrorism policy and foreign policy. The sources analyzed are primarily 
monographs, peer-reviewed journal articles, and newspaper articles. The majority of 
these secondary sources can be found in English, as many Turkish academics publish 
their works in English-language books and journals. English-language websites of 
Turkish newspapers, most notably the socially liberal Hürriyet Daily News and the more 
Islamic and conservative Today’s Zaman, will provide press accounts and illustrate shifts 
in the Sèvres Syndrome and the relation to terrorism. Furthermore, primary sources of 
speeches by Turkish and international government officials will be utilized to provide 
context on how they discuss terrorism in respect to territorial sovereignty. Specifically 
relevant are statements from the Republic of Turkey‘s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) 
and publically-available statements from officials in the Turkish military and executive 
branch. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
To provide readers with a historical basis for Turkey‘s territorial insecurities, 
Chapter II will present a brief history on the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the 
importance of the Treaty of Sèvres to the foundation of the Republic. This section will 
explore how the Republic of Turkey was shaped through territorial claims settled by war, 
and examine the themes of provincial legitimacy and territorial insecurities. The next 
chapter will provide an overview of early terrorism within Turkey and the initial state 
responses. The two main terrorist groups surveyed will be ASALA and the PKK within 
the scope of their territorial claims and threats to the Turkish state. Last, the thesis will 
explore Turkish policymakers‘ perceptions of post-1999 Kurdish terrorism and 
religiously-motivated terrorism to study the impact of historical contextualization in the 
twenty-first century. I will focus specifically on how the previously outlined historical 
variables and trends continue to impact the way Turkey frames the terrorism threat.  
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II. TURKEY’S TERRITORIAL INSECURITIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Turkey‘s imperial past and struggle for territorial sovereignty permeates every 
layer of its domestic and foreign relations. Established in 1923, the Republic of Turkey is 
a young nation drawn from the territory of the Ottoman Empire. After over six hundred 
years of Ottoman rule, the empire‘s dissolution left Turkey‘s territorial borders uncertain. 
In order to oust the foreign occupation of the Allied powers after World War I and define 
its new borders, Turkish nationalists waged and won the War of Independence. The 
period ranging from the slow decay of the Ottoman Empire to the establishment of the 
Republic of Turkey was a formative historical experience that plays a vital role in 
contemporary Turkish politics and society. 
Almost a century after the end of World War I, the dissolution of the Ottoman 
Empire, and the Turkish War of Independence, Turkey is an established state and has 
emerged as a regional power. Out of the post-World War I settlements, the Treaty of 
Lausanne was the only agreement that produced lasting borders and peace that withstood 
the challenge of World War II, although it has not survived entirely unchanged.44 Still, 
there is a pervasive belief among policymakers and the public that the state‘s territorial 
integrity is fragile and under attack. This thesis raises critical questions: How were the 
borders initially framed and defined in the post-Ottoman era? What were the drivers for 
Turkish territorial claims? Why does the Treaty of Sèvres matter to the way Turkey views 
its borders and its lasting territorial anxieties? How does the settlement of post-Lausanne 
territorial questions shape definition of the borders? I argue that these territorial anxieties 
are a direct reaction to the territorial loss and separatist rebellion that occurred during the 
retraction of the Ottoman Empire throughout the twentieth century. Further, this chapter 
argues that the Republic of Turkey conceptualization of its borders began in 1920 with 
the Misak-i Millî (National Pact) and the intersection with the Treaty of Sèvres serves as 
the point of reference for the way Turkey views its national borders.  
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This chapter will first outline the Ottoman Empire‘s experience with territorial 
loss and separatism during the terminating years of the empire. The territorial retraction 
from foreign incursion coupled with internal rebellion from minority groups led late 
Ottoman and early Turkish leaders to view the borders as a critical political issue. 
Second, it will consider the territorial claims and challenges the Turkish nationalist 
leaders made during World War I through the establishment of the Republic. The claims 
were an expansive interpretation of territorial sovereignty, influenced by Wilsonian views 
of self-determination and institutionalized in the National Pact. Next, the reaction to the 
punitive terms of the Treaty of Sèvres shaped the new Republic‘s response to territorial 
questions that were not settled in the Treaty of Lausanne and this section will discuss the 
territorial disputes from 1923-1938. Throughout this period, we see the development of 
an ardent nationalist and insecure politics forming around the limits of Turkey‘s borders. 
Last, this chapter will illustrate how these competing forces have transformed into the 
Sèvres Syndrome which influences the way Turkey views domestic and foreign issues. 
B. TERRITORIAL LOSS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 
The rise and fall of the Ottoman Empire can be illustrated in territorial terms. The 
Empire reached the peak of its territorial expansion in the seventeenth century, but 
Ottoman conquest was not halted by territorial satiation; instead, it reached impenetrable 
empires. In the east, the Safavid dynasty in Iran halted Ottoman expansion into Persia, 
Central Asia, and India. To the northeast, Russia halted Turkish expansion in Crimea 
with their control over the Black Sea and the North Caucasus. The desert of Africa to the 
south posed a geographic challenge of terrain and climate that offered little gains. The 
Ottomans had achieved limited gains to the west in Europe, and in 1683, the Ottoman 
army was defeated after reaching the gates of Vienna.45  
Bernard Lewis argues that the territorial retraction of the Ottoman Empire was 
due to the confrontation with the ―closing of the frontier.‖ The Ottoman political, 
military, and economic systems were designed to expand territorially into non-Muslim 
lands through colonization or war. Once the Ottoman territory had reached these 
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impenetrable boundaries due to the geographic challenges or strong imperial neighbors, 
the empire began its centuries of decline and territorial retraction.46 The empire 
underwent a ―change from the meticulous, conscientious, and strikingly efficient 
bureaucratic government of the sixteenth century to the neglect of the seventeenth and the 
collapse of the eighteenth centuries.‖47 Challenges in agriculture, fiscal stability, a large 
standing army, an oversized and overpaid bureaucratic structure, and the lack of 
technological modernization compared to European adversaries led to internal unrest and 
the loss of territory. The way Ottoman policymakers and Turkish historians viewed their 
borders was formed from centuries of territorial loss spurred by separatist movements 
from ethnic groups within the empire and external imperial claims on territory within 
Ottoman borders. 
1. Legacy of Territorial Loss 
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, territorial loss was a result of 
external threats from regional neighbors. Following a series of wars with other great 
powers such as the Habsburg Empire and Russian Empire, a sequence of treaties led to 
the partition of Ottoman lands. By the end of the nineteenth century, the once great 
empire with expansive territory had transformed into the ―sick man of Europe‖ that was 
at the mercy of European powers.48 This reduction of territory influenced how late 
Ottoman and early Turkish policy makers defined its borders and defended its 
sovereignty from foreign influence in the early years of the Republic. 
The Ottoman defeat at the gates of Vienna in 1683 was a significant turning point 
as the first time the Ottoman Empire was forced to cede territory to the victor. Following 
the Austrian advancement into Ottoman territory, the Ottomans and Austrians signed the 
Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699, which ceded Hungry, Transylvania, and Slavonia to 
Austria.49 Another major territorial loss occurred with the Ottoman defeat in the Russo-
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Turkish War and the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774. Not only was there the loss of 
annexed Christian land, but the Ottoman Empire also forfeited historically Muslim land 
in Crimea and provided the Russian Empire with its first warm water port in the Black 
Sea. In addition to territorial losses, the Ottoman Empire also suffered a moral blow since 
the treaty provided the Russian Empire the right to protect Orthodox Christians. This 
treaty led to much ―heart-searching and discussion‖ from contemporary Ottoman 
statesmen and historians on the future of the Ottoman Empire, particularly the Eastern 
Question: why is the Ottoman Empire in decline?50 
Historically, Europe dodged the Eastern Question by propping up the Ottoman 
Empire as a balance of power strategy. By the late nineteenth century, it was no longer in 
Europe‘s interest to use the Ottoman Empire as a tool against Russian hegemony and the 
Ottomans suffered catastrophic territorial loss. The Treaty of San Stefano after the Russo-
Turkish War of 1877–1878 created an autonomous Bulgarian state of Eastern Rumelia, 
an autonomous area in Thrace, and afforded territory to the independent states of Serbia, 
Montenegro, and Romania. San Stefano was ultimately overturned by the Treaty of 
Berlin due to the balance of power concerns from European powers against the Russian 
Empire. The gains made by the newly liberated states were smaller, but still constituted 
significant losses to the Ottoman Empire as foreign powers began to exert influence 
within the Ottoman Empire with foreign occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Cyprus. Furthermore, the Treaty of Berlin was a major turning point for Ottoman 
territorial loss; the empire lost approximately one third of its territory and twenty percent 
of the population. As seen previously to a limited extent, these losses constituted 
historically Ottoman territory instead of territory gained from conquest of European 
Christian states.51 
Foreign powers also exerted influence over Ottoman provinces and capitalized on 
the separatist movements to intrude on Ottoman territory. In 1912, Austria-Hungry 
formally annexed the Ottoman provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina—territory it had 
occupied since 1876. Other examples included Bulgaria formally annexing Eastern 
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Rumelia; Greece annexing Crete; and Italy successfully invading Ottoman provinces in 
Africa, ending Ottoman rule on the continent.52 Without foreign power intervention on 
behalf of the Ottomans, there was little they could do to counter rival powers. Territorial 
loss can also be tied back to foreign influence due to international partition plans. The 
1916 Sykes-Picot agreement divided the majority of Ottoman territory into Allied spheres 
of influence and areas of direct control. The Russians gained control of Turkey‘s Black 
Sea and eastern Anatolia; the Italians, southwestern Anatolia; the French, a territory from 
Palestine to southern Anatolia including the Syrian coast; and Britain, southern Iraq and 
areas of Persia.53 By the onset of the Turkish War of Independence, territorial claims 
from Russia, Britain, France, Italy, Greece, Armenia, and the Kurds threatened to entirely 
eliminate Turkey from the geopolitical landscape.54 
2. Legacy of Separatism 
The Ottoman Empire was a heterogeneous, multicultural state with a long history 
of internal rebellions originating from minority ethnic and religious groups. The 
territorial loss from the aforementioned treaties weakened the central authority of the 
state, which led to internal opposition to Ottoman rule. The historical basis of separatist 
threats from the ethnic minorities is considerably relevant to the contemporary way that 
Turks interact with minorities, as will be illustrated in later chapters.55 These rebellions 
influenced how late Ottoman and early Turkish policy makers viewed the question of 
borders as a political issue. 
The historical motivations for minority separatism varied. Early rebellion and 
separatism in the Ottoman Empire was spurred by opportunism rather than principled 
opposition to Ottoman rule. Local leaders in areas such as Arabia, Lebanon, and 
Kurdistan were not drawn from the Ottoman or Mamluk elite classes, and used rebellion 
against the state as a tool to increase their personal revenue and power in their 
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provinces.56 Other separatist movements could be rooted in Sultan Abdülhamid II‘s 
strategy for consolidating his rule by pitting internal and external enemies against each 
other.57 Furthermore, the modernizations in technology and transportation allowed 
Ottomans to travel to the West, which spurred the rise of the Eastern Question.58 One 
answer lay in the context of internal rebellions from minority groups that further 
undermined the authority of the Ottoman state, already stressed from the burdens of 
domestic reforms. The 1890s experienced multiple armed separatist movements from 
ethnic non-Turkish minorities in provinces. Since these rebellions occurred in areas 
where these ethnic groups constituted the majority of the territory‘s population, including 
Macedonians, Bulgarians, Albanians, Greeks, Armenians, and Kurds, these territorial 
claims further strained Ottoman sovereignty. 59 
Separatist revolts from domestic minorities were prevalent throughout the 
nineteenth century. Some of the earliest separatist revolts were from the Serbs in 1805, 
the Greeks in 1821, and the Bulgarians in 1875. One of the most notorious separatist 
movements originated in Macedonia, and ultimately culminated in the territorial loss of 
Macedonia in 1912 during the Balkan Wars. The Ottomans were able to maintain 
nominal control over Macedonia after the 1878 Treaty of Berlin, but the root of the 
separatism was not eliminated. Macedonia‘s population was a combination of non-
Turkish ethnic groups such as Serbs, Bulgarians, and Greeks, and a majority of Orthodox 
Christians with a sizable Muslim and Jewish minority. The population of the Macedonia 
province identified as a separate nation and sought to achieve those aspirations through 
terrorism and guerrilla tactics. These tactics were not only focused on gathering 
concessions from the state, but also evoking foreign intervention from diaspora 
communities and other foreign powers in their favor.60 Two internal separatist groups in 
the 1890s included the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO), 
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seeking autonomy of Macedonia, and the External Macedonian Revolutionary Committee 
(EMRO), seeking annexation of Bulgaria. Although the Ottomans managed to stave off 
both of these separatist movements, a coordinated attack by the Balkan states of Serbia, 
Greece, Bulgaria and Montenegro in 1912 led to the conquest of Ottoman Macedonia in 
the First Balkan War. Istanbul concluded the Treaty of London with these four states in 
1913 which resulted in the loss of Macedonia, Albania, and sections of Thrace. This was 
a significant because it represented the loss of almost all of the empire's European 
territories along with territories central to the historical Ottoman identity.61 
The growth and exacerbation of the so-called ―Armenian Question‖ posited 
another equally challenging threat to the empire‘s territorial sovereignty. Armenian 
claims in Anatolia were based on their majority in six eastern provinces.62 From the early 
1870s, nationalism and ethnic identity spread among the Armenian community. 
Armenian resistance groups openly rebelled against the state in the 1890s, and the 
Ottoman state responded with military repression by Hamidiye troops in 1894. Armed 
tension continued through 1896, including an Armenian group threatening to attack the 
Ottoman Bank headquarters.63 To offset the superiority of Ottoman security forces, 
Armenian separatists sought foreign power intervention as means of protecting and 
securing both legal and territorial rights in Anatolia. During a Russian invasion in 
Ottoman territory during World War I, Armenian revolutionaries residing in Anatolia 
joined the Russian troops and sabotaged their homeland behind Ottoman lines. 64 As an 
interwar military necessity to combat domestic insurgency, the Ottoman Empire deported 
the Armenian population to the Syrian desert to physically remove the perceived internal 
threat. In the midst of World War I, the domestic separatist rebellions were viewed as 
threats to the health of the state.65  
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Kurds were also a historic source of rebellion at the end of the Ottoman Empire 
and the early Turkish Republic. It is important to note that Kurdish nationalism did not 
pose a territorial or existential threat to the declining Ottoman state due to Kurdish tribal 
rivalries that divided the community. As long as the Ottoman state permitted the Kurdish 
communities autonomy and self-rule, relations were largely peaceful. After many threats 
to the Ottoman state were defeated by the start of the Republic, the new state started to 
reduce the autonomy previously granted to Kurdish areas. After centuries of self-rule, the 
Kurds resisted Turkish state-building through domestic insurgency and the ensuing 
Kurdish rebellions during the early Republican period will be discussed later in this 
chapter.  
The aforementioned movements demonstrated the weakness of territory, 
language, and common history as tools to knit the empire together, as the Ottomans 
struggled to incorporate the ethnically heterogeneous groups into a national Ottoman 
identity. The inability to harmonize these movements within the political and military 
developments at the international level led to the anxieties regarding territorial integrity 
and foreign intervention discussed in the next section.  
C. TURKISH TERRITORIAL CHALLENGES 
1. Wilsonian Self-Determination 
The nature of the post-World War I settlements dictated the tone of the state 
consolidation during the early Republican period. The 1918 Modros armistice ended 
hostilities in the Middle Eastern theatre and imposed punitive measures accepted by the 
Ottoman government. Outside of the military provisions, the Allied powers reserved the 
right to occupy any territory deemed to be a security threat, particularly the Armenian 
provinces. The end of World War I brought foreign intervention as the norm rather than 
the exception since the Allied powers abused this provision. Furthermore, the 1918 
armistice left key territorial claims unsettled, including the issue of British occupation of 
Mosul and French occupation of Sancak (Hatay) after the armistice.66 The postwar terms 
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established precedents in terms of territory and interaction with foreign states that would 
later be formalized in the Treaty of Sèvres. 
American President Woodrow Wilson affirmed the principle of self-determination 
in the wake of the crumbling of imperial powers after World War I. Wilsonian self-
determination was welcomed by many Ottoman Turks who viewed the Fourteen Points as 
a solution to the challenges to their sovereignty. The Twelfth Point was particularly 
relevant: 
The Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a 
secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under 
Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an 
absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the 
Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships 
and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.67 
This foundation was further bolstered by British Prime Minister David Lloyd George 
who assured that the Allies were not aiming ―to deprive Turkey of its capital, or of the 
rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace, which are predominantly Turkish by 
race.‖68 The Western declarations of ―secure sovereignty‖ for ethnically Turkish Muslims 
were considered even more necessary in light of the Treaty of Sèvres. Since the treaty 
sought to separate territory inhabited by Turkish Muslims from Anatolia, the Wilsonian 
Twelfth Point was seen as a validation and safeguard to their border claims.69 However, 
Wilsonian self-determinism also endorsed the legitimacy of the nationalism that 
contributed to the internal decay of Ottoman territory. Ottoman and Turkish leaders 
tended to focus more on the guarantee of territorial sovereignty rather than the ―security 
of life‖ and ―autonomous development‖ of non-Turkish ethnic groups on Turkish 
territory.70 
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2. Republican Territorial Claims 
In light of the 1918 armistice and the expansion of Wilsonian principles, the 
Ottoman Empire appeared to be heading down the path toward partition and foreign 
intervention. In 1919, Mustafa Kemal, an Ottoman military officer, arrived at a Black Sea 
port, resigned his commission in the Ottoman military, and began to form a revolutionary 
Turkish government. He organized a Turkish nationalist congress in Erzurum that 
published the National Pact in early 1920 outlining the nationalists‘ official aims and 
definition of Turkish sovereignty. The agreed terms of the National Pact were 
communicated internationally to the Allied powers in February 1920.71 As explained 
below, the territorial claims of the National Pact were not fully incorporated into the 
territory apportioned by the Treaty of Lausanne.  
The National Pact‘s six articles highlighted the union of Ottoman Muslims, 
defined by religion, race, and aim.72 Atatürk envisioned a population where religious 
minorities of Jews and Christians—primarily the Armenians and Greeks—on Turkish 
territory were official minorities, and other Muslim groups—including Kurds—were part 
of the Turkish majority. This definition included all Muslim groups that inhabited 
historically Ottoman territory such as the Kurds, Alevis, and Laz. The more expansive 
view of Turkish national sovereignty included more than just Turkish-speaking 
Muslims.73 Ultimately, Atatürk‘s definition of Turkish identity for sovereignty purposes 
was ―territorial, linguistic and political unity strengthened by a sense of common roots, 
morals and history.‖ The exclusion of ethnicity tied Turkish sovereignty closer to Turkish 
territorial claims in the National Pact and the Turkish language.74 This reflects Atatürk‘s 
earlier formulation of Turkish identity and sovereignty more fully based on the Turkish 
language and Islam. Only after the Republic was established in the late 1920s and 1930s 
did Turkish nationalism take on an ethnic tone.  
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Furthermore, the Wilsonian definition of sovereignty was the underpinning for the 
nationalists‘ territorial objectives. Early republican leaders made claims to Eastern 
Anatolia, Mosul, Thrace, and Hatay as the territorial basis of the Republic. Why did the 
leaders choose these borders instead of expanding their claims to all former Ottoman 
land? First, the territory generally aligned with the land apportioned during the 1918 
armistice at Modros ending World War I, providing legal precedent. Next, the pact‘s 
territorial claims excluded areas with majority Christian populations of Greeks and 
Armenians in order to create defensible borders with a majority Turkish population. In 
Atatürk‘s own words, he sought to ―safeguard the life and independence of the nation 
within its frontiers‖; this protection conferred a sacrosanct quality on Turkey‘s territorial 
integrity from the onset.75 Last, the participants at the National Pact were able to gain 
external justification and validation of their territorial claims within the framework of 
Wilsonian principles. According to the Fourteen Points, the Turkish portion of the 
Ottoman Empire was afforded ―secure sovereignty,‖ and freedom of commerce in the 
Dardanelles.76 These Wilsonian principles authenticated the authority of the newly 
envisioned borders without foreign interference to Muslim lands—a much needed right 
after centuries of foreign manipulation and territorial incursion.  
3. Terms of the Treaty of Sèvres 
Since the Central Powers sued for separate peace after World War I, the Ottoman 
Sultan and the Allied powers signed the Treaty of Sèvres on August 10, 1920. The treaty 
reduced the size of the Ottoman Empire to one third of its territory in terms more punitive 
than those assigned to the Germany Empire in the Treaty of Versailles. The terms 
constituted significant territory and sovereignty losses: the Ottoman state lost the territory 
of Eastern Thrace—all the way up to Istanbul—to Greece; Izmir and surrounding 
territory remained under Ottoman territory for five years and then control would be 
determined by a referendum; and the Ottoman Hatay province was allocated to Syria.77 
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The most punishing terms included granting Kurdish provinces autonomy with the 
possibility of independence administered by the League of Nations after a year and the 
creation of an independent Armenian state on Ottoman territory. These revised borders 
reduced the Ottoman Empire to a small piece of northern Asia Minor with Istanbul as the 
capital. The treaty largely reaffirmed the Allied protectorates of Ottoman land outlined in 
the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement in regards to Mosul and Hatay.78  
Although never implemented, Sèvres remains the ―benchmark‖ for the Turkish 
imagination on the ―could have been‖ in their territorial legacy. As summarized by a 
contemporary British diplomat in Istanbul, the memory of the Treaty of Sèvres remained 
―intact, though dead, whole though ungratified.‖79 The eventual territorial claims of 
Turkey were derived from a combination of reaction to the Treaty of Sèvres, protection 
against the separatist movements causing internal turmoil for over a century, and an 
affirmation of Wilsonian ―secure sovereignty.‖ Although superseded by the below 
described Treaty of Lausanne, the legacy of Sèvres wreaked havoc, affecting the way 
Turkish nationalism was defined, questions of ethnicity, and the formation of Republican 
borders.  
4. Treaty of Lausanne 
The territorial destruction waged at Sèvres was unable to be annulled and 
reconciled through peaceful diplomacy. Sensing resistance and the Turkish leaders‘ 
unwillingness to accept the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres, Greek troops—acting on behalf 
of the Allied Powers—occupied Thrace and western Anatolia. A group of Turkish 
nationalists, led by Mustafa Kemal, rejected the treaty outright and launched the War of 
Independence against the occupying Allied Greek forces to prevent implementation. 
After a year of war and the defeat of the Greeks, the Turks triumphed because no other 
Allied Power was willing to assume the military responsibility to fight the Turks.80 The 
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victory of the Turkish nationalist troops led to the Allied government‘s recognition of 
Turkish sovereignty with the implementation of the Treaty of Lausanne. 81 Five years 
after the armistice at Modros ended hostilities between the Allied forces and the Ottoman 
Empire, the Treaty of Lausanne went into force in 1923 to formally end war in the 
Middle Eastern theatre. The treaty officially recognized the Turkish nationalist 
government, abolished the sultanate, and decisively terminated the Ottoman Empire‘s six 
centuries of rule. The subsequent peace negotiations in Lausanne were drastically 
different than the meeting at Sèvres; this time, it was the meeting of equals as Greece 
removed troops from Istanbul, Western Anatolia, and Eastern Thrace and negotiations 
began.82 In contrast to the post-World War I peace treaties signed by Germany, Austria, 
and Bulgaria, the Treaty of Lausanne was more durable from the onset due to Turkey‘s 
role as an equal negotiator.  
The terms of the Treaty of Lausanne formalized the post-War of Independence 
status of territory. Eastern Thrace was officially ceded to Turkey and British control over 
Mosul was affirmed. As victors of the War of Independence and determined to reverse 
the Treaty of Sèvres, Turkish nationalists employed a ―maximalist interpretation‖ of the 
National Pact.83 However, not all prior territorial claims made were sanctioned at 
Lausanne. The National Pact claimed Hatay province (the Iskenderun/Alexandretta area) 
and Mosul province, and permitted referendums in western Thrace and the areas lost to 
Russia in 1878. However, these areas were not incorporated into Republican territory 
with varying responses from early Turkish leaders. Hatay province went to French-ruled 
Syria, Mosul to the British Iraq, and Batum returned to Soviet Georgia. In sum, early 
Turkish leaders agreed to relinquish claims on Western Thrace to Greece in order to 
guarantee the rights of Greeks living in Istanbul. Batum was retained by Soviet Georgia 
in exchange for Turkish control over the Eastern Anatolian provinces of Kars, Ardahan, 
and Artvin, which were already under Turkish military control. Scholars have made 
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claims that Atatürk realized that full implementation of the National Pact could not be 
achieved, but the negotiating stance of the Turkish delegation in Lausanne still lobbied 
for full implementation.84  
Notably, the negotiations at Lausanne aimed to assert the founding concepts of 
Turkish identity and nationalism through downplaying Kurdish and Armenian territorial 
claims. Turkish nationalism was founded on unity defined through territory and common 
history, and Atatürk continued to stress the unity between Turks and Kurds that was 
envisioned in the National Pact. Despite previous Kurdish separatist tendencies, early 
Republican leaders believed that Kurds could be incorporated into the Turkish identity. 
At the negotiations in Lausanne, an early Republican leader and Atatürk‘s eventual 
successor, İsmet İnönü, argued that Kurds were ―Turanians‖ and therefore ethnically 
Turkish.85 It was only in the post-Lausanne era, as Kurdish rebellions promoted a 
separate Kurdish identity, that ethnicity began to be emphasized as an essential 
component of Turkish nationalism to the detriment of Kurdish cultural and linguist 
rights.86 Furthermore, Republican leaders during this period also created a national myth 
of the ―Turkish History Thesis.‖ In order to delegitimize Armenian and Kurdish 
territorial claims and provide a legitimate nation for the new state, Republican leaders 
argued that Turkish civilization descended from the Hittite civilization in Anatolia.87 
Subsequently, the outcome of Lausanne did not recognize the Armenians and the 
Kurds and did not allocate the independent states previously demarcated in the Treaty of 
Sèvres. First, Armenian representation was absent in the Lausanne negotiations. 
Armenians experienced brief independence from 1918-1920 prior to the Treaty of Sèvres, 
but in 1920 Turkish forces defeated Armenian forces. In the following Treaty of 
Alexandropol, Armenia renounced claims to the provinces in Anatolia and accepted 
Turkish jurisdiction. The new Turkish-Armenian border was established during the 
                                                 
84 Mango, From the Sultan to Ataturk, 162-63. 
85 David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, 3
rd
 ed. (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2007), 190. 
86 Göçek, The Transformation of Turkey, 128.  
87 Traditionally, a nation forms a state instead of the other way around.  See Göçek, The 
Transformation of Turkey, 125.  
 29 
Turkish War of Independence at the 1921 Treaty of Kars. After the Treaty of Lausanne, 
Armenia became a subsidiary of the Soviet Union.88 A sovereign and permanent Armenia 
was only established after the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union. Also notable was the absence of an independent Kurdistan during the Lausanne 
negotiations. Instead, Article 29 of the Treaty of Lausanne protected minority rights in 
commerce, religion, and press, but was never fully implemented for the Kurdish 
population in Anatolia. It is not a coincidence that the territorial questions openly 
negotiated and signed at Lausanne produced positive interactions, but the absence of 
Armenian and Kurdish representation and lack of definite settlement has caused decades 
of turmoil. Without a mutual agreement between the groups, Turkey continues to revert 
back to Sèvres as the benchmark for the way it views territorial questions with Kurdish 
and Armenian minorities. 89 
D. TERRITORIAL QUESTIONS 1923–1938 
In the early days of the Republic, Turkish foreign policy was categorized by 
defending the gains made in Lausanne and regaining rightful Turkish territory that was 
left unsettled. In response to the Treaty of Sèvres, Turkish nationalism emerged as ―state 
borders nationalism‖ around the Anatolian territory and Turkey developed a distinct 
―survivalist instinct‖ that strengthened nationalist justifications.90 In the early stages of 
the republic, Turkish nationalism and the inviolability of territory merged into one 
principle. As outlined above, Turkish identity in the early Republican period was still ill-
defined. The period from the establishment of the Republic in 1923 to Atatürk‘s death in 
1938 was a tumultuous period where Turkish borders were solidified and Turkish identity 
further evolved.  
One defining force in the 1920s and 1930s was the prevalence of Kurdish 
rebellions. It was only after the uniting factor of Muslim identity decreased without a 
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common Christian enemy from the Greek occupation during the War of Independence 
that cleavages emerged between the Turks and the Kurds. In 1925, Sheik Said led a 
rebellion of Kurdish tribes against the abolition of the Islamic Caliphate.91 For the first 
time since Lausanne, the army was deployed and it marked the beginning of an era of 
razing of Kurdish villages and martial law in areas with Kurdish populations. By 1937, 
the historically defiant city of Dersim began to revolt; the costs of repression were high 
for both the Turkish military and the Kurds.92 Between 1924 and 1938, there were a total 
of seventeen Kurdish rebellions. These rebellions highlight multiple themes present in 
early Kurdish unrest and separatism: Kurdish nationalism, resistance to the process of 
state centralization, and inter-tribal rivalry.93 Taking into account the nature of Kurdish 
movements in the Ottoman period, it is likely that the rebellions were more due to the 
infringement of Kurdish autonomy during the state building process than Kurdish 
nationalism.  
Conversely, the repressive response to Kurdish separatism illustrates that the 
Kemalist government perceived the rebellions as serious threats to the newly established 
state. Since these movements challenged Turkish sovereignty over the new territory 
claims, Turkish nationalism took an ethnic turn in order to eliminate the Kurdish 
challenge. This manifested in the suppression of the Kurdish cultural and linguistic 
identity in order to eradicate Kurdish ethnic claims and unite Kurds into the Turkish 
national identity. Therefore, the Kurdish uprisings represented one of the most serious 
threats to Turkish politicians in the formative stages of the Republic and Kurdish 
separatism has historically been seen as an existential threat to the Republic‘s territorial 
integrity.94 
In the following territorial questions of Mosul and Hatay, it is important to note 
the role ethnicity plays in territorial matters. Territorial integrity was still the founding 
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precondition for national cohesion and a strong Turkish state, but ethnicity increased in 
importance and was used as a tool to fortify Turkish borders. Therefore, territory claims 
were integral to the state apparatus and the rejection of the Treaty of Sèvres had not been 
completed. Although Lausanne had resolved the majority of the territorial disputes and 
ushered in an era of lasting peace, the Turkish claims on Mosul and Hatay remained 
unresolved due to the ambiguity created by Sèvres. 
1. Mosul 
In the early 1920s, Mosul province had a majority Kurdish population with a 
Turkish minority. Originally ceded to the French in the Sykes-Picot agreement, it was 
later turned over to the British mandate of Iraq. In the National Pact, Turkey claimed 
Mosul as part of its territory to expel foreign influence and delineate its borders. The 
Treaty of Lausanne left the Mosul dispute unresolved, and there were attempts at direct 
negotiations between Turkey and Britain. In order to gain control over Mosul, Turkey 
pursued all avenues short of war including signing a new treaty with the Russians to 
pressure the British and instigating a Kurdish rebellion against the British in Mosul. 
Ultimately, the League of Nations stepped in to directly in 1926 and ceded the territory to 
the British mandate of Iraq, which Turkey accepted. In return, Turkey received a 
monetary settlement from the British.95 Although Turkey formally accepted this 
settlement, Turkish leaders still retained the hope of regaining Mosul well into the 
twenty-first century. In multiple instances during the 1990s, Turkish politicians used the 
tens of thousands of Turkish soldiers operating within Iraq as justification for a change in 
the Turkish-Iraqi border in favor of Turkey.96 As recently as June 2014, there were 
reports of Turkey and the Islamic State utilizing water from the Euphrates River as an 
instrument to punish Mosul.97 In a press release, the Turkish MFA retold how both Iraq 
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and Syria have exploited water shortages for their own political purposes in order to 
assert territorial claims.98 
Mosul was another demonstration of the way that Turkish leaders defined their 
borders in terms of territory and Western influence. Instead of acquiescing to the League 
of Nations, Turkey used the territorial dispute as an opportunity to assert its sovereignty. 
Mosul was integral to the Turkish state for its economic value due to the oil revenue and 
its territorial contribution to bolstering Turkish sovereignty was important in both the 
early Republic period and beyond. Additionally, Mosul is an important episode that 
highlights the intersection of ethnic and territorial claims. Throughout the twentieth 
century, Mosul remained an unfulfilled focus of Turkish irredentists who focused on the 
Wilsonian arguments made at Lausanne as the true basis of Turkish territory. For Turks, 
Mosul also represented British influence in Turkish territorial affairs and support for 
Kurdish nationalism. Many believe that the British supported the Sheik Said rebellion in 
the Mosul region, which resulted in British mandate over the territory in the Lausanne 
negotiations. These theorists claim that the Kurdish rebellion persuaded Turkey to not 
pursue territorial claims over Mosul and the British-supported rebellion was designed to 
demonstrate the difficulties over ruling Kurdish territory. Future Turkish governments 
point to British mandate over Mosul as Western support for Kurdish nationalism, and 
therefore, support for Kurdish statehood.99 These fears remain ingrained in the nationalist 
psyche and Turkey‘s failure to annex Mosul continues to aggravate the concerns over 
territorial integrity and foreign intervention.  
2. Hatay 
Another post-Lausanne territorial question was the outcome of Hatay.100 In the 
aftermath of World War I, the League of Nations sought to implement ―Wilsonian‖ self-
determination with a mandate system intended to bridge earlier colonialism with full 
independence to the local populations. The Ankara Treaty, a separate peace treaty 
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between France and Turkey demarcated the Turko-Syrian border, but also provided a 
special status for Turkish inhabitants. The Turkish minority in Hatay was granted full 
cultural rights and Turkish was recognized as an official language. In 1923, the Treaty of 
Lausanne ceded Hatay to French-mandated Syria. This existed as the territorial status quo 
until France granted Syria independence and created Hatay province as an autonomous 
region within Syria in 1936.101  
Taking advantage of the polyglot and heterogeneous population within Syria and 
the special status of the Turkish minority, Turkey asserted its territorial claims on Hatay 
after Syrian independence. Consistent with the post-Sèvres view of borders, Turkey made 
irredentist territorial claims in Hatay based on a common Turkish identity tied to 
language and ancestry. There was a legend that while serving in Hatay in World War I, 
Atatürk was moved by the Turkish-speaking population and sought incorporation into the 
new state. Although French mandate officers counted Turks as 39 percent of Hatay‘s 
population in 1936, Turkey was able to argue that Turks were the majority population by 
claiming the Nusayris (Alawites), Hatay‘s second largest group, as part of the Turkish 
majority since significant minority populations of Alawites, Sunni Arabs, Kurds, 
Turcomen, and Armenians existed. Another basis of Turkish claims was that the 
population shared fellow Hittite ancestry; Turkey changed the name to Hatay and the 
people were referred to as Eti Türkleri to emphasize the Hittite origins.102 Atatürk 
utilized Hatay as an instrument of nationalism and claimed that the Hatay issue kept ―our 
nation occupied every day‖ and the area‘s ―genuine owners are pure Turks.‖103 Turkish 
claims to Hatay were based on more than irredentism—Turkey did not claim the land of 
Turkish speakers in Bulgaria—but also based on strategic and political motives. 
Strategically, Turkey needed Hatay as a buffer zone to protect its vulnerable port from 
Italian invasion, similar to World War I. In the context of the 1937 Dersim uprising and 
state consolidation, Hatay was a microcosm for Turkey‘s political ambitions to assert 
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itself as a developed state.104 Turkish territorial claims represented an important 
protection of territorial integrity that needed to be further iterated and protected after the 
Treaty of Sèvres.  
The League of Nations attempted to settle the issue by creating an independent 
state of Hatay in 1937, but the fledgling state suffered from grave external pressures and 
internal disarray. For example, the French asserted their influence by supporting domestic 
rebellions against Turkey by Kurdish, Armenian, and Assyrian groups. As independent 
Hatay synchronized their political, economic, and military policies with neighboring 
Turkey, the Turkish majority in the region expanded as unprotected minority groups fled. 
Ultimately, France transferred power in return for protection against Turkish aggression 
during World War II and Turkey officially annexed Hatay as its sixty-third province in 
1939. Newly liberated Syria, however, contested France‘s ability to supersede the terms 
of the Treaty of Lausanne. Although officially part of Turkey, Syria still lays claims to 
Hatay and official Syrian maps include Hatay, including a map on the Syrian 
Parliament‘s website. The dispute has never been officially resolved, and has recently 
been resurrected in diplomatic channels. In 1998, Turkey accused Syria of supporting 
Kurdish separatist groups and Syria alleged Turkey diverted water from the Euphrates 
River. Today, Syria infrequently raises the issue on the international scene due to fears of 
provoking a demonstration of force from Turkey.105 
E. LEGACY OF SÈVRES  
As outlined above, Turkish borders were in flux from the establishment of the 
Republic until the outbreak of WWII. The onset of another world war inflamed Turkish 
ingrained historical hostility and suspicion toward great power politics.  
1. World War II and NATO 
Turkey‘s territorial anxieties continued throughout the subsequent decades and 
influenced its reluctance to enter World War II. In World War I, the Ottoman Empire 
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entered the war on behalf of the Central Powers; future Turkish leaders saw this alliance 
as a disastrous first step that culminated in the Treaty of Sèvres. In a direct reaction to the 
internal threats at the end of the Ottoman Empire and the alliances that dragged the 
Ottomans into war, the new republic sought to consolidate and ensure its territorial 
integrity through non-aggression pacts and friendship treaties. The Turkish government 
signed friendship treaties with the Soviet Union (1921, extended in 1925), Greece (1930), 
and Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Greece (1934). In addition, relations were also 
normalized with Iran, Afghanistan, and Iraq during the interwar period. This guarded 
foreign policy sought to keep the newly consolidated state neutral as the world moved 
toward a second world war.106 
In World War II, Turkey continued its trajectory of non-interventionism in order 
to protect its new borders. Although the war reached the Turkish borders in 1941 with 
German occupation of Greece and Bulgaria joining the Axis powers, Turkey remained 
neutral. By 1944, Turkey confronted the possibility of post-war isolation if it maintained 
its neutrality, so it declared war on Germany in February 1945 purely in order to qualify 
as a founding member of the United Nations. The consistent policy of détente and 
neutrality just short of isolationism illustrates the skepticism of both the Atatürk and 
Inönü administrations to intervention and manipulation from European powers. With 
Turkish borders in flux up until 1938 and few means for safeguarding its territory, 
Turkish leaders could not risk a post-World War II settlement resembling Sèvres. This 
fear of territorial loss due to foreign manipulation provided the foundation for the way in 
which Turkish politicians shaped foreign policy in the interwar period. 107 
During the Cold War, the goal of protecting territorial integrity brought Turkey to 
the other extreme of foreign policy. The Soviet Union‘s territorial challenge was the 
catalyst for Turkey‘s shift toward westernization and integration in order to obtain 
security guarantees from stronger states. After Turkey declared war on Germany in 
February 1945, the Soviet Union abrogated the 1925 Soviet-Turkish friendship 
agreement that regulated the Black Sea Straits and the Soviet-Turkish border on the 
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Armenian provinces. The Soviet Union made territorial claims on the Turkish provinces 
of Kars and Ardahan in order to augment the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic. During 
this time, Turkish leaders were forced to rely on Western intervention by the United 
States and Britain in order to thwart Soviet influence and territorial gain.108 Turkish 
politicians feared that Soviet territorial claims could set a precedent for the reversal of 
other newly established borders.  
The Soviet claim on Turkish territory overturned Turkey‘s policy of neutrality 
and instead propelled Turkey toward increased westernization to retain and defend its 
borders. By the start of the Cold War, Turkey was an active member in defense alliances 
and economic integration relationships: Organization of European Economic Cooperation 
(1948), the Council of Europe (1949), and NATO (1952).109 Particularly, Turkey pursued 
membership in NATO as a tool to protect against dismemberment from foreign territorial 
claims. As the United States poured money into states bordering the Soviet Union as a 
strategy of Cold War maneuvering, Turkey utilized this money to bolster its military and 
national security establishment to protect against both internal and external threats. 
Instead of being at the mercy of foreign powers, Turkey hoped that its inclusion into the 
European system would act as a deterrent to intervention and as a protection to its 
borders.110 As will be discussed further in Chapter IV, the inclusion into the Western 
system has its limits—Turkey rejected NATO use of its territory during the 2003 
invasion of Iraq. 
2. Sèvres Syndrome 
The territorial loss and history of separatism at the end of the Ottoman Empire 
and the early Republican period is most critical to understanding how the Treaty of 
Sèvres transformed into the Sèvres Syndrome. The challenges to Turkish territorial 
integrity in the Republican era contain two central themes: fear of foreign intervention 
from Western powers and anxiety over territorial dismemberment as a result of internal 
                                                 
108 Hovsepyan, ―The Fears of Turkey: The Sèvres Syndrome,‖ 9-10.  
109 Jung, ―The Sèvres Syndrome,‖ 8. 
110 Fuller, The New Turkish Republic, 33.  
 37 
rebellion or external claims. As will be described in the following chapters, these beliefs 
have become the focal point for Turkish leaders to make decisions on matters such as 
reactions to minority groups and counterterrorism policies. Ultimately, these themes can 
be tied to how the Treaty of Sèvres provided early Turkish leaders and public the 
historical context for their territorial anxieties. This ingrained fear of Sèvres has 
developed into an obsession, disease, or ―syndrome‖ within the Turkish public. 
Specifically, the ―Sèvres syndrome refers to those individuals, groups or institutions in 
Turkey who interpret all public interactions—domestic and foreign— through a 
framework of fear and anxiety over the possible annihilation, abandonment or betrayal of 
the Turkish state by the West.‖111 
The culmination of Ottoman separatism and territorial loss into the Sèvres 
Syndrome illustrates the importance of this early history. Instead of being expunged by 
Turkey‘s favorable and secure borders, the last 150 years of Ottoman territorial loss has 
proven to be a critical formative period influencing future eras. There is a wide-ranging 
consensus between early Republican leaders through contemporary Turkish leaders that 
Sèvres represents the culmination of the previously outlined internal separatist 
movements and external claims that plagued the Empire for a century. Regardless of the 
nature of the international system, these concerns endure and constitute continuity 
between past and present. Göçek argues that the new Turkish state repressed the memory 
of decades of Ottoman territorial loss, the destruction of the Empire, and continuous war 
from 1912–22. The inability of the state to come to terms with this history and the nature 
of Republican state-building provides the reason that the Sèvres Treaty was transformed 
into a syndrome.112 
The first tenet of the Sèvres Syndrome is fear of foreign intervention from 
Western powers. After the above articulated history, Turkish leaders connected the 
domestic rebellions with the belief that the rebellions were fermented or supported by a 
foreign state. By the time the rebellions were put down in 1938, the international 
environment of the Cold War sustained the Syndrome from the 1940s to the fall of the 
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Soviet Union. The subsequent Westernization process with globalization and the rise of 
the European Union has allowed the Syndrome to remain through the present.113 
Furthermore, contemporary Turkish leadership identifies that external factors are 
―permanently‖ threatening Turkish internal stability.114 To a degree, Turkey believes it is 
a pariah state encircled by enemies that seek its destruction—a sentiment that has been 
articulated by Turkish policymakers‘ rhetoric.115 Instead of continuously evaluating the 
relationship between the West and Turkey, Turkish leaders fixate on the early Republican 
view of the West as ―a monolithic, aggressive force to be defended against.‖116 Some 
Turkish commentators are careful to keep the Treaty of Sèvres contextualized instead of 
extracting it from the surrounding historical events. In 1998, Turkish columnist Zulfu 
Livaneli posited: ―Even in the worst days of the war, [Atatürk] did not directly oppose 
Western powers even though they were trying to divide Turkey…We are afraid of 
Sèvres, but we don‘t learn from the man who put Sèvres in its grave.‖117 A static 
assessment of the West compared to contemporary events in the dynamic international 
arena has transformed Sèvres into a syndrome affecting both foreign and domestic policy.  
Second, Turkish leaders have developed an ingrained anxiety over territorial 
dismemberment. As outlined above, there is a pervasive anxiety originating in 1921 that 
domestic and international powers are trying to whittle Turkish territory to a nub. The 
Treaty of Sèvres was predicated at a particular historical moment when ninety percent of 
Ottoman territory was lost from 1878 to 1918 and the six-century-old Empire was 
abolished by the West.118 This deep historical humiliation transformed fears of early 
Republican leaders into a syndrome that would plague multiple generations of Turkish 
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leaders. As illustrated above, the fear of territorial dismemberment is important since the 
founding basis of Turkish nationalism is common territory, not ethnicity. Any action that 
suggests a change in Turkish territory inadvertently challenges the very foundation of 
Turkish identity.  
Within the context of fears of Western intervention, manifestations of the Sèvres 
Syndrome are most prevalent in Armenian and Kurdish issues. As Turkish nationalism 
shifted toward an emphasis on ethnicity rather than language and religion, Sèvres 
provided a justification for the creation of minorities as ‗enemies of the state.‘ 
Incorrectly, homogeneous ethno-nationalism was constructed as the fundamental basis of 
Turkish identity. Once this myth institutionalized in the Republican period, the previous 
benign minority rebellions were refashioned as existential threats to the state. Göçek 
highlights the role of Sèvres in this transformation:  
Just like the Sèvres Treaty, which had attempted to determine the future of 
the Ottoman Empire along the dimensions of religion and ethnicity, the 
Sèvres syndrome it generated led the Turkish state and military to identify 
and exclude social groups along the same lines.119 
The harsh realities of the Treaty of Sèvres map provide a glimpse of the counterfactual 
and serve as an explanation for the way Turks view their territorial integrity. 
Last, the Sèvres Syndrome has manifested through references to the treaty by 
Turkish leaders and policymakers throughout the twentieth century. First, one 
explanation for the thriving legacy of Sèvres decades into the Republican era is the 
sustained leadership of the Ottoman generation until the end of the Cold War.120 Next, 
Turkish leaders have a propensity to frame political problems as Western conspiracies. 
One recent example is former President Süleyman Demirel‘s twisting European concerns 
for Kurdish cultural rights as the desire for the West ―to involve the Sèvres Treaty to set 
up a Kurdish state in the region.‖121 Furthermore, Foreign Minister Davutoğlu also 
stated: 
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Since it was through the Treaty of Lausanne [in 1923] that the Turkish 
Republic, born on the ashes of the Ottoman Empire, had guaranteed its 
security and sovereignty, Turkish policy-makers think that any changes to 
this treaty would produce security risks [to the Republic].122 
These statements by top Turkish policymakers illustrate the legacy of Sèvres and the 
leaders‘ predisposition to point to the treaty‘s culpability during periods of insecurity. 
Although Sèvres is conveniently pointed to as the foundation of all threats to Turkish 
territorial integrity, there are also arguments that the most significant threat is the 
―centripetal societal forces‖ resulting from the ―Kemalist modernization project.‖123 The 
effects of these contemporary on Turkish leader perceptions will be explored in chapters 
III and IV. 
F. CONCLUSION 
The survey of early Republican history illustrates that these formative years have 
a lasting impact on the way Turkish policymakers and the public view their history. The 
decades of territorial retraction and domestic separatism during the late Ottoman period 
shaped the way these leaders viewed minorities and the protection of territory with 
Sèvres viewed as both the culmination and epitome of these historical experiences. The 
experience at Sèvres transformed Turkey‘s borders into more than lines on a map—they 
were and remain critical political issues that symbolize the veracity of identity and 
nationalism. Also, Sèvres provided the seemingly separatist Kurdish and Armenian 
population validation for Anatolian territorial claims that continue to plague the national 
consciousness. Although Lausanne has triumphed in international law, the historical 
memory makes it impossible for policymakers and the public to look past Sèvres and 
focus on Lausanne.   
Two themes emerge: the changes in the definition of Kurdish nationalism and the 
omnipotence of the aborted Treaty of Sèvres in the Turkish national psyche. Both these 
themes validate the chapter‘s hypothesis that the terms and legacy of the Treaty of Sèvres 
are most important in the way Turkey frames domestic threats as a danger to its territorial 
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integrity, and that they affect the evolution of the Turkish national consciousness and the 
development of its security framework. This particular historical memory of incessant 
territorial loss, a decade of war, and foreign territorial claims on Anatolia illustrates how 
the Sèvres Syndrome cannot be easily overcome. Although it is now poised to be a leader 
in the region, Turkey‘s borders were in flux merely sixty years ago and Turkey ended its 
diplomatic isolation within the past fifty years. An understanding both the historical 
foundation and of the Sèvres Syndrome is necessary to appreciate how Turkish leaders 
make connections between contemporary events and the late Ottoman and early 
Republican history. Still, these forces continue to dictate Turkey‘s domestic and foreign 
relations, particularly relating to questions of terrorism within Turkey.  
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III. EARLY TERRORISM IN TURKEY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Turkey has historically experienced periods of domestic unrest and internal 
rebellion, but separatist terrorism in the mid-twentieth century spurred a unique reaction 
from Turkish authorities. After a period of rebellion provoked by the consolidation of the 
Turkish state, domestic peace was established by the time of Atatürk‘s death in 1938. 
Stability was largely maintained in the post-World War II era, but the introduction of free 
party politics and economic liberalization ushered in the ―Euro-terrorism‖ of the 1970s 
and 1980s into Turkey. In the international arena, terrorism was increasingly being used 
as a tool—or weapon—to achieve political goals. The terrorist groups during this period 
were largely Marxist, but many had ethnic and separatist goals including the IRA in the 
United Kingdom, ETA in Spain, the Red Brigades in Italy, the Baader-Meinhof gang in 
Germany, and Action Directe in France. Influenced by these international leftist groups, 
Turkey itself experienced a wave of ideological terrorism from Marxist student groups. 
Importantly, the violent leftist movements in Turkey were not viewed as existential 
challenges to the territorial integrity of the Turkish state. The internationalized 
acceptance of terror as a method for national liberation further aggravated Turkish fears 
that domestic terrorism could spur territorial loss.124 
During the rise of international terrorism, the late Ottoman and early Republican 
interpretations of dissent ironically remained relevant to the ASALA and PKK 
insurgencies that began in the 1970s and 1980s. Fifty years after the Ottoman Empire was 
defeated and a generation after Turkey‘s borders were fully defined, Turkey had 
seemingly broken ties with its Ottoman past. Despite the re-definition of its historical 
roots, the Treaty of Sèvres and the separatism of the early Republican period remained a 
point of reference for the Turkish government‘s rhetoric when responding to domestic 
terrorism. Both the PKK and ASALA have directly challenged Turkey‘s territorial 
integrity by calling for the creation of separate states carved out of the post-Republic 
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Anatolian borders. Furthermore, ASALA and PKK militants justified their statehood and 
territorial goals based on terms found in the Treaty of Sèvres—a tendency which fanned 
the popular and elite insecurities. The Sèvres Syndrome is evident as Turkish officials 
make rhetorical connections between separatism during the early Republican period and 
subsequent Armenian and Kurdish terrorist groups.125 Although Turkish leaders largely 
operated under the premise of conspiracy theories in order to legitimize their endangered 
position, there is a factual basis for foreign support of both ASALA and PKK terrorism 
and the historical precedent of autonomous Armenian and Kurdish states carved out of 
Turkish territory.126 
In this chapter, I argue that Turkey‘s perception of separatist terrorism and the 
counterterrorism policies it employs are based in the historical context of the Treaty of 
Sèvres and the Sèvres Syndrome. First, the fear of separatism has influenced the way the 
state views minority groups—in this case Armenian and Kurdish—as threats to the writ 
of the state since the early Republican period. Preceding instances of domestic rebellion 
were opportunities for foreign intervention in Turkish minority politics; therefore, the 
state‘s fear runs deeper than an immediate threat to the monopoly on the use of force. 
Subsequently, the state has confronted the groups‘ terrorist tactics as existential 
challenges to its territorial integrity. Fears of the minority have persisted even after the 
groups shifted to non-territorial goals or the group was defeated militarily. Furthermore, 
evidence of extensive foreign support for ASALA and the PKK exacerbates the Sèvres 
Syndrome fear of Western dismemberment, and aspects of Turkish foreign policy are 
driven by the reaction to these fears. This chapter will provide evidence on how Turkish 
authorities and the general Turkish public make rhetorical connections between ASALA 
and PKK terrorism and the Armenian and Kurdish rebellions after the Treaty of Sèvres. 
B. ASALA 
Armenian nationalists have been active on Turkish territory both non-violently 
and through armed resistance since the days of the Ottoman Empire. In 1896, Armenian 
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nationalist revolutionaries from the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF), also 
known as Dashnaktsutyun, attempted to take over the Ottoman Bank in Istanbul. In 
response to this attack and growing mistreatment of the Armenian minority, the Sultan 
responded with repression of Armenians across the empire that resulted in the death of 
hundreds of thousands of Armenians between 1894 and 1896.127 Decades of continuous 
loss of Ottoman territory and the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres institutionalized the 
existing fears of separatist minority groups in early Republican leaders. Armenian 
separatism peaked during World War I when Armenian volunteers fought against the 
Ottoman Empire as part of a French foreign national legion, La Légion Arménienne. 
Another instance of violent opposition in the post-World War I period was Operation 
Nemesis, where the ARF assassinated Ottoman and Azerbaijani leaders for their role in 
the Armenian genocide. After the establishment of the Republic, Armenians within 
Turkey were recognized as a protected minority and violent opposition dwindled, but the 
Armenian community did not have widespread resolution on Ottoman injustices. On 
April 24, 1965—the fiftieth anniversary of the 1915 genocide—Lebanese Armenians 
protested in front of the Turkish Embassy in the first Genocide Commemoration Day.128 
With the international community still silent, members of the Armenian community 
reacted with a wave of terrorism targeted at Turkish diplomats. Due to the Sèvres 
Syndrome, rhetoric from contemporary news articles and statements by Turkish 
authorities illustrates connections between separatism from the Ottoman Empire and the 
fear of Western manipulation to ASALA terrorism.  
1. Origins of Violent Armenian Nationalism and ASALA 
The 1915 Armenian genocide assumes great significance in understanding 
ASALA terrorism and the Turkish response. After decades of continuous territorial loss, 
Ottoman leaders were hypersensitive to any perceived domestic subversion. As discussed 
in Chapter II, during World War I, Russian troops invaded Anatolia and Armenians were 
accused of providing domestic support to the Russian forces. The late Ottoman leaders 
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viewed the sympathetic Armenian population as an internal threat during wartime and 
moved to deport them from Anatolia. The deportation to the Syrian desert resulted in the 
deaths of hundreds of thousands of Armenians.129 At the time of the publication, the 
Turkish government had not acknowledged its role in the genocide or apologized for the 
deaths. During the rise of identity politics in the 1960s, the Armenian diaspora 
increasingly identified with the shared historical grievance of the 1915 genocide. Similar 
to the Treaty of Sèvres for Turks, memories of the genocide were deliberately transferred 
to the next generation to prevent loss of the historical legacy.130 Instead of choosing to 
replace these painful memories with the reality of improved relations with the Turks, the 
genocide was instead chosen by Armenians as the rallying point to promote their 
common identity. By the 1970s, the Armenian community had failed to garner 
international attention for the Ottoman Empire‘s destruction of Armenians and pay for 
these wrongdoings through peaceful methods.131 After non-violent attempts for support 
had largely failed to gain traction, radical members of the Armenian community moved 
to violent methods.  
The first instance of Armenian terrorism was the targeted killing of Turkish 
diplomats by an Armenian nationalist not affiliated with any terror group, in Los 
Angeles, California, in 1973.132 Gourgen Yanikian was a survivor of the 1894 Armenian 
mass murders; his family survived by seeking refuge in the Persian Consulate and as a 
child, his brother was killed by Turks. He immigrated to the United States in 1946 where 
he quickly gained wealth and established himself as a writer and producer of literature 
and plays. Despite this prosperity, he still identified with the Armenian genocide and 
sought his own form of justice. In 1973, he organized a meeting with two Turkish 
diplomats near his Santa Barbara home in a ploy to sell a piece of artwork allegedly 
stolen from an Ottoman sultan. Although there were instances of protests from the 
Armenian community in Los Angeles and Turkish diplomats frequently requested armed 
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guards, the two diplomats took no security precautions. During the meeting, Yanikian 
murdered both men with a handgun and allowed himself to be arrested.133  
Through his own writing, seventy-seven-year-old Gourgen Yanikian asserted that 
the attack was motivated by the Armenian genocide and that violence was the only 
method to avenge the historical violence. Although the Turkish diplomats were not part 
of the Ottoman government that perpetrated the violence, Yanikian viewed the officials 
as symbols of decades of injustice.134 In his letter to multiple major news outlets and 
public officials, Yanikian stated that the Turks ―exterminated 2 million of our race, took 
over our land, our wealth.‖135 He also highlighted that his shift to violence was necessary 
because ―the Armenian individual is the only one who will awaken from a long sleep and 
personally seek his rights from the brutal Turks with the kind of language that only they 
can understand.‖136 According to George Mason, the editor of the California Courier, 
who received a copy of Yanikian‘s letter, he believed that Yanikian‘s actions were not 
representative of the Armenian community, and that others would not follow this 
example.137 Unfortunately, this was far from the reality of the next two decades.  
In 1975, Syrian-Armenian Hagop Hagopian founded ASALA in Beirut as 
approximately the same time that multiple other Armenian militant groups were 
founded.138 One group, the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG), 
operated as the military wing of the ARF. Although these groups were historically 
enemies, the feuding factions united in 1975 for joint genocide remembrance ceremonies 
which led to more closely coordinated attacks.139 Hagopian‘s group, ASALA, was based 
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in Lebanon until the 1982 Israeli invasion, where new bases were established in 
Damascus and Athens.140 
2. ASALA Activities and State Response  
As terrorism from ASALA and other Armenian militant groups increased and 
gained support the 1970s and 1980s, Yanikian‘s assassination of Turkish diplomats 
endured as the template for future attacks. According to official records from the Turkish 
MFA, Armenian terrorists killed thirty-one diplomats and immediate family members in 
sixteen different countries between 1973 and 1984.141 Other estimates put the toll of 
Armenian terrorism as high as forty-two Turkish diplomats assassinated in 110 incidents 
in twenty-one countries.142 One CIA counterterrorism cited Armenian terrorists as one of 
the most ―effective‖ terror groups due to their estimated 87% fatality rate compared to the 
14% average.143 
Armenian terrorism also escalated domestically within Turkey, but it did not 
dramatically alter the generally positive relations between the Turkish and Armenian 
communities. Turkish targets of Armenian terrorism included Turkish Airlines, tourist 
offices, and railway stations. The first domestic attack was in 1982; two Armenians 
launched an attack on Ankara‘s Esenboğa Airport which killed nine people and wounded 
seventy. In another incident, an Armenian self-immolated in Istanbul‘s Taksim Square. 
Notably, these Armenian militants were not Turkish citizens signaling that Armenian 
terrorism emanated from radicals within the diaspora community.144 Within Turkey, 
Turks and Armenians lived in harmony and Armenians enjoyed political and cultural 
rights as a protected minority group. The Gregorian Christian population practiced freely, 
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and in the 1980s, multiple Armenian-language schools existed. Despite these positive 
relations, rhetoric from the Armenian community in Turkey consistently expressed 
concern over relations souring if violence continued. Although uncommon, there were 
instances of retaliations against Armenian churches after the assassination of Turkish 
diplomats abroad. More common, however, were instances of police and military troops 
protecting Armenian churches and schools against possible attacks.145 
The contemporary media, statements from Armenian terrorists, and ASALA 
sympathizers make linkages between ASALA terrorism of the 1970s and 1980s and 
Armenian separatism at the end of the Ottoman Empire. One news article contends that 
the current Armenian-Turkish friction dates back to Ottoman times and this dissonance 
resulted in the Ottoman extermination of Armenians from Anatolia during this period.146 
Similarly, after the 1982 Ankara airport attack, an Armenian statement proclaimed that 
the attack was a response to ―the Turkish fascist occupation of our land‖ and the terrorists 
lectured airport hostages on their demands for a separate Armenian state in eastern 
Turkey.147 This statement and these demands are predicated on the belief that the 
contemporary borders of Turkey were illegitimate and the land is historically—and 
therefore rightfully—Armenian. At Gourgen Yanikian‘s widely attended funeral in 1984, 
Yanikian‘s attorney memorialized him by stating that, ―In our heart of hearts, we know 
he had not committed an act of murder, he had committed an act of justice.‖148 Short of 
approving or condoning violence, members of the Armenian community praised 
Yanikian‘s contribution toward bringing international attention to the injustices 
Armenians suffered. One eulogy epitomized Yanikian as a ―symbol of our frustration.‖149 
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Reactions from policymakers indicate that Armenian terrorism within Turkey‘s 
territorial borders and Turkish counterterrorism measures increased correspondingly. 
However, the Turkish counterterrorism response to ASALA throughout the 1970s and 
early 1980s was largely ineffective. ASALA terrorism took a significant economic toll on 
Turkey with high costs to fortifying Turkish diplomatic facilities both within Turkey and 
abroad.150 Turkish authorities were largely able to curtail ASALA from operating within 
Turkish territory, but these constraints instigated ASALA‘s proliferation through 
Armenian communities abroad. Expectedly, after ASALA‘s first major attack on Turkish 
territory with the 1982 Ankara airport attack, rhetoric from Turkish policymakers 
illustrates the reaction. Turkish President, General Kenan Evren, asserted that ―All this 
blood will not go unrevenged in history.‖151 Contemporary journalists interpreted this 
statement to not threaten Armenians living within Turkey, but through paramilitary 
operations against Armenian terrorists abroad. Although overt counterterrorism policies 
remained limited, there is evidence of covert targeted assassinations of Armenians 
sanctioned by the Turkish state during the 1970s and 1980s. Although there is not 
conclusive evidence, a contemporary investigative journalist suspected that a state-funded 
Turkish group could have orchestrated the assassination of ASALA leader Hagop 
Hagopian.152 
The inflection point for ASALA success came after the 1983 attack at Orly airport 
in Paris, France. In July 1983, Armenian militants detonated a bomb in front of the 
Turkish Airlines desk which killed eight tourists and wounded ninety people.153 Among 
two other Armenian groups, ASALA claimed responsibility in order to avenge the 
―massacre of hundreds of thousands of Armenians in Turkey between 1984 and 1915.‖154 
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ASALA had frequently operated on French territory, killing eighteen people between 
1975 and 1983. The July 1983 attack was the most damaging terrorist attack since the end 
of World War II, and evoked a strong French response.155 Turkey had been critical of 
French commitment to counterterror policies, and this distrust was evident in rhetoric 
from Turkish policymakers. After the Orly attack, General Evren issued a statement 
avowing that ―the patience of the Turkish nation is not unlimited.‖156 Furthermore, 
Foreign Minister Ilter Turkmen said, ―the Turkish nation‘s retaliation will be as heavy as 
its patience has been great‖157 and criticized ―those who support or tolerate terrorism.‖158 
These statements highlight how Turkish government officials perceived French tacit 
acceptance for Armenian terrorism due to their lack of full counterterror response. After 
years of ASALA attacks on French territory without a strong counterterror response, 
French authorities fully responded to the Orly airport bombing. These operations led to 
the dismantlement of ASALA in France and contributed to the ultimate downfall of the 
group in 1986.159 
Although damaging to Turkey‘s relations with neighboring states and its image 
abroad, the isolated attacks and targeted assassinations of diplomats hardly constituted a 
tangible threat to Turkish existence without a connection to Armenian separatism from 
the end of the Ottoman Empire. In 2001, author Dr. Andrew Mango gave a presentation 
on the historical roots of Armenian terrorism at a meeting for the Promotion of 
Democratic Principles in Istanbul; an abstract of his talk is published on Turkish MFA 
website.160 He argues that the Armenian nationalism during the end of the Ottoman 
Empire was the impetus for decades of adverse relations between Armenians and Turks 
that was in principle resolved at the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. Mango asserts that 
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Armenian nationalist politicians are trying to reopen this account ―not in the cause of 
historical accuracy, which should be left to historians,‖ and to ―use the past as a 
justification for irredentism.‖161 The forces of separatism, irredentism, and challenges to 
territorial integrity remain relevant during the ASALA attacks of the 1970s and 1980s 
even though they were settled in the early Republican period.  
Furthermore, scholar Fatma Müge Göçek makes the connection between fears of 
Armenian collusion with foreign actors in the early twentieth century and interpretations 
of ASALA terrorism within this same context of foreign support. She contends that 
Western states used ASALA assassinations of Turkish diplomats as a proxy to interfere 
in Turkish domestic affairs.162 As the entire Armenian community became framed as 
―terrorists‖ and the existence of the Armenian population within Turkey‘s territorial 
borders was once again designated as a threat to the Turkish state, this actuated the belief 
that Sèvres was not dead, but merely dormant.163 Sèvres could then be revived by 
Western powers as a future device for dividing Turkey. Additionally, the decade of 
Turkish diplomats as the targets of Armenian terrorism undermined Turkish foreign 
policy. This generation of Turkish diplomats innately mistrusted Armenians and resisted 
establishing diplomatic relations with Armenia. Göçek argues that these perceptions and 
reactions of ASALA terrorism as a continuation of Armenian rebellion at the end of the 
Ottoman Empire perpetrated and further entrenched the Sèvres Syndrome in the Turkish 
public.164 
3. Dissolution 
The dedicated French counterterror response to ASALA terrorism after the Orly 
attack virtually ended the violence worldwide and hastened the group to dissolution. The 
large scale attack and the public backlash provided Yves Bonnet, the head of the French 
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counter-terror and counter-intelligence police, the ―green light.‖165 In the following 
months, the French police coordinated national police forces in massive operation to 
arrest the ASALA network within France. Although ASALA violence largely ended 
around the same time as the Orly attack, the dismantlement should also be attributed to 
FBI operations after the assassination of the Honorary Consul in Boston and strong 
protests from Ankara.166 After the Orly attack, there were only two subsequent ASALA 
attacks with an unsuccessful attack on the Turkish embassy in Lisbon in June 1983 and 
an attack on the Turkish embassy in Ottawa in March 1985. 167 From 1988 to 1994, 
violent attacks believed to be another derivation of Armenian terror other than ASALA 
targeted Azerbaijan in retaliation for the Armenian-Azeri conflict.168 
The dissolution of ASALA resulted from a combination of factors that 
traditionally signal the end of terrorist movements: internal schisms, reduction of 
financial backing, loss of public support, the death of a charismatic leader, and the 
achievement of goals.169 For ASALA, the end was spurred by the Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon, the death of their leader, internal schism, and the loss of financial backing from 
Armenian diaspora after violent attacks. As schisms continued, the group lost their 
political focus and was consumed by an internal power struggle. The leadership 
embarked on a spiral of assassinations that decimated the leadership and alienated 
supports. By 1988, Hagopian was targeted by multiple states and intelligence groups; he 
was murdered in Athens by unknown assailants.170 Ultimately, the use of indiscriminate 
violence against civilians undermined Armenian public support that was vital for 
ASALA‘s existence. 
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4. Goals and Territorial Claims 
ASALA‘s key goals were threefold: force the Turkish government to recognize 
the 1915 Armenian genocide; obtain Turkish payment of reparations for the genocide; 
and achieve Turkish cession of the land necessary to create the Armenia promised in the 
Treaty of Sèvres.171 Founder and leader Hagop Hagopian further articulated in a 1983 
interview: 
We demand the clear and unequivocal recognition of the massacres, and of 
our right to settle on our own soil, and there to establish our own nation. 
We are prepared for the revolutionary burden this imposes upon us, 
however bloody the price that we might pay.172 
The scope of these goals cast Turkey as the target due to the perceived imperial nature of 
historic Ottoman and Turkish oppression and domination of the Armenian population in 
Anatolia. ASALA members frequently referenced these goals after an attack by claiming 
responsibility through a phone call or letter.173 In addition, a short term goal of Armenian 
terrorists was the release of Armenian prisoners from foreign prisons. After multiple 
attacks, Armenian militants issued statements that the violence would continue in 
countries such as the United States, Canada, France, Britain, Switzerland, and Sweden if 
Armenian terrorists were not released.174 
ASALA‘s goals required and sought support from the ethnic Armenians both 
within Turkey‘s borders and internationally. In the words of Hagopian, ―[Our] primary 
objectives are to introduce the Armenian cause to world public opinion, and make the 
world feel that there is a desolate people that lacks a homeland or identity, and to arouse 
the national feeling of the Armenian diaspora.‖175 Initially, the group sought to unify 
Armenians living in diaspora communities abroad who had gained wealth and stature. 
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Without a territorial homeland, Armenian nationalists attempted to combat assimilation 
that would weaken their population. The Armenian genocide was utilized as a common 
platform to mobilize the diaspora population in order to promote ethnic cohesion and 
prevent assimilation.176 It is important to separate the goals of ASALA from the goals of 
peaceful Armenian political or nationalist groups. More expansive than the goals of 
achieving international recognition of the Armenian genocide, ASALA also sought an 
independent Armenian state based on historic territory. While Turkish recognition of the 
genocide would be a disheartening blow for the national psyche, the creation of an 
Armenian state on Anatolian territory is an existential threat to Turkey‘s territorial 
existence. 
ASALA‘s political claim for the creation of a homeland on historic Armenian 
territory was the point on the platform most feared by Turkish leaders. Striking at the 
core of Turkish nationalism based on Wilsonian self-determination and the promise of 
―secure sovereignty,‖ Armenian militants used the same Wilsonian justifications for their 
statehood claims. For example, they reiterated that it is ―the cornerstone and most 
important element for our cause‖ and that Armenians have ―the right…to live in their 
homeland and the right to self-determination.‖177 If Turkish claims were legitimate, why 
were Armenian claims not? Beyond principles, ASALA‘s territorial claims had a 
historical basis in the Treaty of Sèvres. The Treaty of Sèvres provided Western validation 
that Armenian claims to the western Anatolia of Erzurum, Bitlis, and Van were authentic. 
Furthermore, ASALA stated that its principle aim was to ―liberate Western Armenia 
[Turkey] and join it to today‘s liberated Soviet Armenia, forming an integral, 
revolutionary Armenia.‖178 Decades after the dissolution of ASALA, Foreign Minister 
Davutoğlu asserted in 2009 that ―Neither Armenia, nor any other country will dare to 
present territorial demands to Turkey.‖179 Instead of analyzing the normalization of 
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Turkish-Armenian foreign relations in a contemporary context, the Sèvres Syndrome 
narrows the view to the historical anxieties of the Ottoman Empire.  
Although ASALA was disbanded in 1986, there has been intermittent evidence of 
violence from Armenian terrorists in the following decades. In 1991, ASALA claimed 
responsibility for an attack on the Turkish ambassador to Hungary. Contrary to the 
previous general support from the Armenian community, this attack was met with 
condemnation. The criticism was not only regarding violence, but also distain for the 
revival of Ottoman injustices through violence. By the 1990s, the Armenian government 
began to change its official position by moving closer to dropping territorial claims on 
eastern Turkey and references to the Armenian genocide. This shift is evidenced in 
Armenian statements; Akin Gonen, a state minister and government spokesman, stated 
that ―we now want bygones to be bygones, to start again in this new era.‖180 Instead of 
emphasizing the past and underscoring how the historical legacies shape present policy, 
these shifts illustrate a willingness to move past reactions to Ottoman era injustices. 
5. International Support 
International support was integral to ASALA‘s existence, success, and survival. 
The expanding scope of ASALA‘s goals combined with the limited support from the 
Armenian community provided the logistical necessity for ASALA‘s dependence on 
foreign support. Not only did ASALA seek foreign support, but states supported ASALA 
due to their ―own political axe to grind with Turkey‖ and used ASALA as a means to 
attain their own limited ends.181 In order to achieve their goals, ASALA sought to 
instigate the formation of coalitions and networks among the Armenian community, 
creating a united front. ASALA specifically appealed to the Armenian diaspora in Europe 
and the United States in an attempt to awaken international support and unity of 
Armenian national aspirations. One strategy for mobilizing the Armenian diaspora was 
demonstrations outside Armenian consulates on Genocide Day (April 24). 182 
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From the onset, Armenian terrorists were supported by Palestinians in Lebanon 
and Syria. Armenian nationalism took a violent turn in 1975 when the Armenian support 
during the Lebanese civil war shifted from Christian groups to the PLO. Lebanon 
provided a safe haven for training and logistical support until Israel expelled the PLO 
from Beirut in 1982. Although initial logistical support for ASALA originated from the 
PLO, evidence exists that Syria later hosted training camps independent of Palestinian 
influence. It is likely that Syrian support for Armenian terrorism was a result of lingering 
resentment over the 1939 Turkish annexation of Hatay. In 1983, Turkey cited Syrian 
support for ASALA as the justification for building a dam on the Euphrates River that 
caused water shortages in Syria—a policy that has shaped the trajectory of subsequent 
Turkish-Syrian relations.183  
Decreased Lebanese, Palestinian, and Syrian support for ASALA drove the group 
to take sanctuary in the France‘s liberal political environment. France is home to a large 
Armenian diaspora community and was sympathetic to the lack of Turkish recognition 
for the 1915 genocide.184 Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, France was a haven for 
ASALA terrorists and the group was able to operate under implicit approval and 
tolerance from French authorities. After a spate of attacks in the early 1980s, journalists 
reported that the French ―cut a deal‖; ASALA senior leader, Monte Melkonian, would be 
released and ASALA would stop bombings on French territory.185 This tenuous truce 
ended in 1983 as a result of ASALA‘s major attack on Orly Airport. While serving a life 
sentence for his role in the 1983 attack, ASALA member Varadjian Garbidjian, claimed 
that the bomb at Orly Airport was intended to detonate on the Turkish Airlines flight, not 
in the French airport.186 Regardless, distrust remains in French-Turkish relations on 
Armenian issues and impedes cooperation; in the late 1980s France allegedly refused to 
share a picture of Hagopian to aid Turkish counterterror efforts.187 
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The Soviets provided support to ASALA on the basis of Cold War desires to 
undermine NATO ally Turkey, but backing was limited due to ASALA‘s nationalist 
desire to mobilize Soviet Armenians. A point on ASALA‘s platform included convincing 
the Soviet Union to directly assist ASALA by creating a revolutionary movement to 
destroy ―Turkish colonialism.‖188 ASALA‘s direct appeal for Soviet intervention would 
understandably disquiet Turkish leaders‘ ideological anxieties as well as foreign policy 
concerns. Turkey territorial anxieties regarding foreign interference from the Soviet 
Union already existed due to the post-World War II Soviet claims on Kars, Ardahan, and 
Artvin. Since these territorial claims strike at the heart of the Sèvres Syndrome, Turkish 
leaders viewed ASALA as under Soviet influence and as a direct territorial threat to the 
state. To balance the international system during the Cold War, Soviet leaders likely 
provided indirect logistical support through Syrian or Palestinian third parties. Soviet 
leaders, moreover, only provided limited support since ASALA sought a territorial 
homeland that could arouse nationalist and separatist interests damaging to Soviet 
territorial integrity.189 
C. PKK 
During the same time period, another ethnic minority within Turkey—the 
Kurds—also presented a perceived existential territorial threat to the state. Unlike the 
Armenians who were a protected minority due to their Christian religion, the Muslim 
Kurds were not afforded minority rights. In the context of denying the Kurds as a 
separate ethnic group, Kurdish nationalism rose as suppression increased. As seen in the 
goals and territorial claims, foreign influence, state response, and pre-1999 movement 
toward peace, the struggle between the Turkish state and the PKK embodies the central 
features of Turkish nationalism in the Republican period: ultimate protection of territorial 
integrity at the expense of the suppression of minority rights.190 The state‘s ability to 
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continue to frame the PKK as supported by external factors provided the Turkish security 
establishment a justification for military force against the Kurds.191 
Despite the historically disorganized and ineffective nature of Kurdish rebellions, 
Turkish politicians have historically identified demonstrations of Kurdish nationalism as 
a threat to Turkish sovereignty due to the foundational territorial focus of Turkish 
nationalism. The consolidation of the Turkish state involved the suppression of Kurdish 
rebellions before Turkey‘s territorial borders were fully solidified and the Turkish 
nationalist identity was fully established. It is important to note that Kurdish separatism 
did not pose a threat to Ottoman territorial sovereignty since Kurdish nationalism did not 
emerge until the Republican period.192 It is only after the shift in the definition of Turkish 
nationalism that Kurdish movements began to be seen as a threat by Turkish leaders. 
Therefore, even weak and disjointed efforts from ethnic minorities were considered ―an 
existential threat to the very foundations of the nascent nation-state.‖193  
The connection between the Kurdish rebellions of the early Republican period 
and the onset of Kurdish political violence in the 1970s provides the basis for the state‘s 
perceived existential threat from the PKK. The PKK operated within the mountainous 
region where the influence of the central government was traditionally weak. By 
operating in the same regions as the rebellions at the end of the Ottoman Empire, the 
PKK inherited the tradition of separatist violence against the state. In its formative years, 
the PKK was too weak to pose a genuine threat to Turkish security forces and the 
Kurdish revolutionaries were considered ―bandits.‖ By 1984, the PKK began to earnestly 
pursue their separatist agenda by attacking state targets. After decades of relative peace 
with the Kurdish community, the Turkish government was facing the first military 
challenge to the state since the Kurdish rebellions of the 1920s and 1930s.194 The 
repression of the 1970s was the catalyst for a level of unity unseen in the early Kurdish 
rebellions, creating a more significant armed threat from revolutionary Kurdish groups.  
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The previously suppressed Kurdish nationalism was able to take root within the 
context of Marxism and the leftist ideology of the 1970s. From 1938 through the 
establishment of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Turkey (TKDP) in 1965, no Kurdish 
nationalist parties existed within Turkey.195 One explanation for the resurgence is that 
after a period of Kurdish liberalization in the post-World War II democratization process, 
the 1970s ushered in an era of Kurdish repression. By the 1980 military coup and the 
1982 Constitution, the Turkish state institutionalized the denial of Kurds as a separate 
ethnicity from Turkish and began to suppress leftist and nationalist movements within the 
Kurdish community. The previous associations between leftist groups and Kurdish 
nationalists weakened as Kurdish groups sought to independently represent their own 
rights.196 A third account is that the Kurdish nationalist movement radicalized during the 
violence of the Turkish economic and political crisis in the 1970s.197 The increase in 
Kurdish nationalism has been categorized as a ―revival‖ of the early Republican Kurdish 
movement.198 The combination of the social, economic, and political factors contributed 
toward the radicalization of Kurdish nationalism and the transformation of the PKK into 
a terrorist organization. 
1. Origins of the PKK 
In Blood and Belief, author Aliza Marcus outlines the origins of the PKK. The 
PKK emerged at the intersection of Marxist, leftist groups, and the Kurdish nationalist 
movement. The founder, Abdullah (Apo) Öcalan was a Kurd from Turkey‘s Urfa region 
and gained support while studying political science at Ankara University. In 1974, a 
small group of lower-class Kurds formed the Ankara Democratic Higher Education 
Association (ADYÖD), but the group quickly disbanded as Öcalan sought to use the 
group to further his illegal activities. The low socioeconomic status of the group spurred 
nationalist action rather than ideological sophistication previously seen in other Marxist 
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groups. Since the Turkish socialist organizations were unwilling to fully support Kurdish 
grievances, Öcalan formed a new group—the beginnings of the PKK—that pursued 
Kurdish nationalism as the primary rallying point. Still, the nascent PKK retained its 
leftist ideology, which dictated aspects of PKK organization and goals throughout its 
existence. By 1978, the PKK was formally established in the Lice district of Diyarbakır 
with a Central Committee of seven to eight core members, including Abdullah Öcalan 
(General Secretary), Kesire Yildirim, Şahin Dönmez, Cemil Bayık, Mehmet Karasungur, 
Mazlum Doğan, and Mehmet Hayri Durmuş. Of these founding members, many would 
either abandon the PKK, be killed during in-fighting, or were imprisoned.199 
Just prior to the 1980 military coup in Turkey, Öcalan sought refuge amongst the 
Palestinian groups operating within Syria to avoid the mass arrests of political dissidents 
in Turkey. Moving underground, the PKK began to establish bases in southeastern 
Turkey and the Kurdish territories of northern Iraq and benefited from the porous borders 
caused by the chaos of the Iran-Iraq War. In the early 1980s, the PKK held multiple party 
congresses to develop its strategic defenses and return to Turkish territory. For typical 
Kurds, the atmosphere in Turkey became increasingly dire; the civilian leadership 
instituted laws stating that every citizen of Turkey was a Turk and under special law 
2932, Kurdish languages were banned within Turkey.200 The denial of even basic cultural 
and political rights contributed to increased Kurdish public support for the PKK. In 1983, 
PKK militants killed three Turkish soldiers which resulted in Turkish airstrikes in Iraqi 
territory at the permission of Iraqi authorities. By 1984, PKK militants attacked Turkish 
security utilizing guerrilla-war tactics, although early attacks were categorized as basic 
hit-and-run tactics.201 
Before discussing the PKK activities, it is important to note that the PKK 
represent the margins of Kurdish nationalism. The majority of Kurds seek increased 
political and cultural rights and prosperity for rural southeastern Turkey. Also, only a 
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small fraction of Kurds espouse the PKK‘s use of violence since the Marxist ideology of 
the early PKK failed to gain traction with the Sunni Muslim Kurdish population. For 
example, in 1989 Ismail Hakki Onal, a Kurdish member of the Turkish Parliament, spoke 
on behalf of the general Kurdish population: ―Kurds don‘t want to establish a separate 
state…We just want out [sic] culture.‖202 Despite this reality, ―the Kemalist elite views 
Kurdish nationalism…almost naturally through the prism of the Sèvres Syndrome.‖203 
Instead of viewing terrorism and PKK militants as the territorial threats to the state, the 
Sèvres Syndrome generalizes the threat to all Kurds, regardless of their sympathies. In 
one assessment, this has led to a reaction from Turkish authorities that gives the PKK the 
implicit authority and power to set the Kurdish agenda in the public sphere.204 Prior to 
the 1980s, the ―Kurdish Question‖ was discussed in mainstream news in regard to the 
Kurdish resistance in Iraq led by Mustafa Barzani. The plight of the Turkish Kurds 
surfaced in press reports during the 1980s, largely in response to the violence involved 
with the PKK.205 
2. PKK Activities and State Response 
After the onset of violence in 1984, the PKK defined its struggle as a national war 
of liberation involving propaganda, attacks against state collaborators, and widespread 
riots and boycotts. At the third party congress in 1986, PKK leadership sought to expand 
the ranks of the foot soldiers in order to increase the number of attacks. By 1987, 
contemporary newspaper reports identified a ―Kurdish resurgence‖ and a ―recent 
escalation in Kurdish guerilla attacks.‖206 The situation continued to securitize as the 
Turkish government mandated the Emergency Rule Law (OHAL) in eleven provinces in 
southeastern Turkey. This measure granted sweeping extrajudicial powers to Turkish 
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authorities in an effort to restore public order. Instead of guaranteeing public safety, 
OHAL measures infringed on human rights and ideals of justice with long periods of 
pretrial detention.207 Additionally, Turkish authorities introduced a village-guard system 
to augment traditional defense against the PKK. During this time, rhetoric from Turkish 
journalists and policymakers illustrated that this violence was viewed on the same 
continuum as earlier Kurdish violent rebellions. For example, Turkish journalist İsmet 
İmset related the 1980s guard system to the Ottoman Hamidiye regiments that functioned 
to preserve Kurdish tribal allegiance to central authorities.208 
The PKK‘s tactics sought to weaken Turkish authority through a combination of 
destroying state infrastructure and coercing the Kurdish public to support the PKK. To 
undermine the ability of the state to provide public services, PKK targeted government 
employees including teachers, prayer leaders, doctors, mayors; government facilities such 
as health centers, post offices, bridges; and state-owned industry including road 
construction, mining machinery, and irrigation facilities. Furthermore, the PKK sought to 
damage tourism in Turkish by attacking organizations and locations facilitating to the 
tourist industry, kidnapping tourists, and detonating bombs that killed tourists.209 In 
southeastern Turkey, the PKK established itself as the alternative source of authority 
through the submission of villagers through brutal raids.  
As both public support in Eastern Turkey and the death toll from PKK violence 
increased, the military continued to securitize the threat and assumed ―carte blanche‖ 
powers to more effectively combat the PKK. One example was the Anti-terror Law of 
1991 which broadly defined terrorist acts and enemies of the state to encompass any act 
that threatened the supremacy of the state.210 For example, Article 8 stated that ―Written 
propaganda, assemblies, meetings and demonstrations aimed at damaging the indivisible 
unity of the Turkish Republic with its territory and nation are prohibited regardless of 
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methods, intentions and ideas behind them.‖211 Under this framework, calls for Kurdish 
cultural rights could be characterized as terrorism. Therefore, the Turkish state denied 
even modest Kurdish cultural rights and continued to rely on military force due to the 
perception that even the smallest concession would lead to an opening, resulting in 
Kurdish statehood.212 This is best iterated by a Turkish military statement:  
The PKK intends first to raise the debate of cultural and social reforms for 
the Kurds. If this is tolerated, the PKK will raise the issue of autonomy or 
a federation. If this is tolerated, it will create an independent Kurdish state. 
And, again if nothing is done, Kurds living in four countries will unite and 
create the true Independent Kurdistan. Thus, even pursuing language 
rights for Kurds in turkey—let alone Kurdish radio and television 
broadcasts—is to be regarded as serving the PKK‘s interests. Period.213 
Similarly, President Süleyman Demirel asserted that concessions would result in 
―compromise after compromise with no end.‖214 This rhetoric illustrates the reaction of 
the military and political leadership directly conflated Kurdish cultural rights with the 
establishment of an independent Kurdistan. Although these statements do not directly 
reference the Treaty of Sèvres, the jump from cultural rights to Kurdish statehood 
illustrates that Turkish military and political leaders are viewing Kurdish issues through 
the Sèvres Syndrome.  
By the 1990s, Kurdish groups and the PKK alike disassociated from calls for 
independence and Kurdish statehood. Notably, Öcalan stated in a 1990 interview: 
―There‘s no question of separating from Turkey. My people need Turkey: we can‘t split 
for at least 40 years…unity will bring strength.‖215 After a decade of violence, Turkish 
authorities were unable to embrace this shift to legal means as legitimate. In 1989, a New 
York Times reporter identified that Turkey could not square its commitment to 
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―Turkishness‖ and territorial integrity with Kurdish cultural rights until PKK violence 
waned.216 In an unprecedented move for a head of state, President Özal instigated a 
Kurdish opening. The Turkish government legalized spoken Kurdish; offered amnesty to 
Kurdish militants, including Öcalan; released political prisoners; and Özal even revealed 
his own Kurdish heritage.217 These moderations led to negotiations with the PKK, but the 
brief 1993 ceasefire between Turkey and the PKK ended when Özal suddenly died in 
office. According to contemporary newspaper reports, the Turkish government was 
generally unwilling to acquiesce to Öcalan‘s demands for Kurdish cultural rights and 
federalism due to the preponderance of the Turkish military. Reportedly, the Turkish 
government believed that Turkish soldiers outnumbered Kurdish militants ten to one; 
Öcalan believed that he has the support of Turkey‘s Kurdish population and at least 
toleration from neighboring states.218 Although a separate Kurdish identity had been 
propagated and encouraged within Turkey, the state response reinforced this and 
strengthened Kurdish nationalism. Instead of decreasing the violence, the use of military 
force provided the PKK with a narrative of state repression, resulting in publicity and 
enlarged support from the population.219 
After Özal died, the Turkish government reverted to securitization as violence 
reached the level of civil war in southeastern Turkey. PKK violence reached unforeseen 
levels equivalent with a civil war in southeastern Turkey; thousands of civilians died and 
Turkish forces suffered significant military setbacks.220 The death toll from 1984–1991 
was 4,000 people and from 1992–1995 it scaled to 21,000 people.221 Still, Turkish 
leaders continued to affirm the Turkish military‘s role in managing the PKK: in 1993, 
Prime Minister Demirel signaled that ―just security forces‖ will manage the PKK and 
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Defense Minister Nezvat Ayaz stated, ―The Government has nothing to do with the 
operational developments because it is the security forces that have to fight against 
terrorism.‖222 By 1994, defense spending for emergency rule totaled $11.1 billion and 
constituted a significant part of Turkish GDP.223 The tide began to turn in 1995 when the 
Turkish military‘s chief of staff assumed supreme authority over the PKK 
counterterrorism strategy. The Turkish military deployed 35,000 troops into eastern 
Anatolia and northern Iraq in the largest military operation since the start of the Kurdish 
insurrection, but this campaign only resulted in marginal gains.224 By 1997, Turkish 
military and intelligence officers admitted that the conflict could not be resolved 
militarily.225 Some Turkish leaders favored dialogue, but top leaders rejected these 
discussions. In 1996, Defense Minister Turhan Tayan stated, ―the state will not enter into 
bargaining with the separatist bandits‖ and then-Democratic Left Party (DSP) leader 
Bulent Ecevit argued that PKK supporters ranging from the Kurdish Parliament to 
foreigners aspired to speak for the Kurds and revive the Sèvres Treaty.226 These 
references to both Sèvres and separatism expound how a viable solution remained out of 
reach.  
The PKK‘s activities and the Turkish counterterrorism response illustrates that 
early Republican interpretations of Kurdish nationalist and separatism remain relevant 
throughout the century. The Treaty of Sèvres and the subsequent Sèvres Syndrome 
perpetuates the belief that Turkey is encircled by both domestic and foreign enemies that 
aim to destroy the state. Turkey‘s former general chief of staff Hüseyin Kivrikoğlu stated 
that ―the Turkish Armed Forces are prepared to fight against all kinds of terrorism and 
fundamentalism as well as against internal and external threats regardless what it 
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costs.‖227 The Sèvres Syndrome is also evident in the public realm; a 1994 letter to the 
editor of the Washington Post argued that Turkish concessions to Kurds were impossible 
due to Turkey‘s foundational history based on sovereignty and protection of its territorial 
integrity.228 Connecting the PKK with Kurdish separatism in the early Republican period, 
in 1996 Defense Minister Turhan Tayan avowed, ―The state will not enter into bargaining 
with the separatist bandits.‖229 A decade after its foundation, the rhetorical responses 
from both policymakers and the public illustrates that the Turkish state was still unable to 
reconcile the recognition of Muslim minorities within Turkish territorial borders and 
preservation of the unitary nature of Turkish nationalism.230 
In the late 1990s, an opening on the discussion from Turkish policymakers 
resulted in a decrease in PKK violence. These reforms were spurred by the Turkish 
government‘s realization that the price was too high in terms of lives lost, military 
expenditures, and damage to the Turkish image abroad as European Union membership 
talks stalled. Moderations included the recognition of Nevruz, legitimizing the Kurdish 
language and Kurdish music, and reforming emergency laws. Furthermore, some Turkish 
politicians adopted the pan-Islamic stance that identified Kurds as fellow Muslims which 
contributed to more moderate views. Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan stated, ―There is 
nothing more absurd than ethnic differentiation among Muslim brothers.‖231 Likewise, 
then-Refah Party Deputy Chairman Abdullah Gül connected the communal relations 
between Kurds and Turks during the Ottoman Empire as evidence that a common 
Muslim identity can unite the two groups.232 These Ottoman connections reference 
notions of identity devoid of the ethnic distinction that emerged during the early 
Republic‘s struggles with separatism and territorial integrity. 
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In the public sphere, editorials and reports in the late 1990s from both Turkish and 
international newspapers began to openly question the efficacy of repressing the Kurdish 
identity. For example, as the tide was beginning to turn in 1995, a columnist for the 
Turkish daily newspaper Milliyet illustrated the legitimate injustices of the Kurds through 
this quip: ―What if it were said that in Kurdey there were no Turks and everyone in fact 
was a Kurd and those who thought themselves Turks were, in fact, sea Kurds.‖233 In the 
late 1990s, the Christian Science Monitor printed an article critical of the Turkish human 
rights abuses, highlighting how states throughout Europe and Asia and with states such as 
Austria, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, and Russia sympathetically hosted sessions of 
the Kurdish Parliament ―in exile.‖234 These two examples serve as illustrations of the 
start of international public discussions on Kurdish issues from writers and policymakers 
who do not view Kurdish nationalism through the lens of Sèvres. 
3. Öcalan’s Arrest 
The most significant blow to the PKK came in 1999 with the capture of Öcalan—
the uncontested leader since the group‘s formation. As Turkey increased the pressure on 
Syria to stop providing Öcalan sanctuary on Syrian territory, Öcalan was forced to leave 
Syria in 1998. He transited between Italy, Russia, and Greece before seeking political 
asylum on a Greek diplomatic compound in Kenya. As the international community put 
pressure on Greece to surrender the PKK leader, Öcalan frantically pursued other 
avenues for asylum. After receiving news of Holland‘s acceptance, he was lured into a 
plot devised by Turkish officials to capture and arrest him.235 
In Turkey, the nature of Öcalan‘s capture was laced with suspicion characterized 
by the Sèvres Syndrome. Although Syria‘s expulsion of Öcalan should have been a 
victory for Turkey, the publicity surrounding his capture and Italy‘s refusal to extradite 
him resulted in increased awareness and sympathy for the Kurdish cause.236 In 1998, 
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Turkey made statements that directly linked the Treaty of Sèvres with European attitudes 
toward Öcalan. First, Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz made this reference in regards to 
Öcalan‘s capture: ―I don‘t like to say this, but some European countries are longing for a 
revival of Sèvres…all these efforts are in vain.‖237 Incoming Prime Minister Bulent 
Ecevit reiterated, ―Their ambition for a new Sèvres will not be fulfilled.‖238 Additionally, 
in 1998 Turkish citizens reacted to Italian shelter of Öcalan by boycotting Italian items to 
protesting with signs with slogans such as ―Turkey Will Never be Divided‖ and ―No to 
Sèvres!‖239 
Another example of the relevance of early Republican interpretations of dissent 
was the connections between Kurdish separatist Sheik Said and PKK leader Öcalan. 
Ironically, Öcalan‘s death sentence was issued on the seventy fourth anniversary of Sheik 
Said‘s death sentence. In Stephen Kinzer‘s 1999 article, he highlights the parallels 
between the movements and also interviews likeminded Turks, including a Kurdish 
engineer who states, ―The same thing that is happening in 1925 is happening today.‖240 
These examples illustrate that the reactions to the Sèvres Syndrome assume many forms: 
it can manifest through direct reference to the Treaty of Sèvres or through the belief that 
contemporary internal enemies are linked to the same nationalism that threatened Turkey 
during the early Republican period.  
4. Goals and Territorial Claims 
The PKK‘s ideology has shifted from its inception to Öcalan‘s capture, and will 
likely continue to evolve throughout the PKK‘s existence. At its core, the PKK initially 
sought a Kurdish state based on Marxist-Leninist principles. The group‘s target 
audience—the economically marginalized Kurds of southeastern Turkey—were not 
swayed by theories of class conflict. Öcalan leveraged the political reality and instead 
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used historical grievances surrounding Kurdish nationalism as the mobilizing tool among 
the base of support. Additionally, socialism lost ideological popularity after the fall of the 
Soviet Union and Öcalan reduced his outward socialist leanings. Notably, the 1995 
Congress approved removing the hammer and sickle from the PKK flag.241  
The core goals of the PKK are Kurdish self-determination, a unified separate state 
of Kurdistan, and protection of Kurdish political and cultural rights. In response to the 
aforementioned developments, Öcalan and the PKK Congress dramatically shifted its 
goals in the late 1990s and agreed to accept Turkey‘s existing borders if Turkish 
authorities supported Kurdish cultural rights and democratic political formations.242 The 
evolution of Kurdish goals indicates that territory has a different meaning for the Kurds. 
Although territory is undeniably important toward accomplishing their goals, ultimately, 
recognition and protection of the Kurdish identity has proven to be the most critical and 
enduring objective.  
In his own writing, Öcalan‘s views on Turkish territory shed light on the 
interactions between PKK goals and Turkish territorial anxieties. Öcalan asserts that 
Turkish nationalism must move past the Kemalist ties to territory and interpretations that 
Turkish territory belongs solely to the Turkish ethnicity. He also argues that the PKK 
emerged to resolve the question: Do the Kurds exist? He concedes that democratic 
resolution of this issue is impossible within the founding structure of the Republic. 
Instead of referencing the Treaty of Sèvres to provide his claims legitimacy, he makes 
multiple allusions to the National Pact—the foundational document for Turkey‘s 
definition of its territorial claims.243 Interestingly, Öcalan makes indirect references to 
the Turkish policymakers‘ Sèvres Syndrome by highlighting that Turkey continues to re-
live the period from 1920—1925 and referencing the ―interpretation of the circular 
process of events.‖244 
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As evidenced by rhetoric in Western newspapers, the PKK succeeded in raising 
the importance of the ―Kurdish Question‖ both on the international stage and within 
Turkey. Despite its use of violence, the media coverage on the denial of Kurdish rights 
provoked an international discuss on minorities within Turkey that transcended Öcalan 
and the PKK. In a 1998 editorial in the Christian Science Monitor, Mustafa Malik 
highlighted the similarities of Öcalan‘s quest for Kurdish statehood to Yasser Arafat‘s 
pursuit of a separate state of Palestine. Malik states,  
Whatever Öcalan‘s fate, his odyssey is likely to help put the Kurdish 
question on the global political agenda where it belongs. The Kurds are 
the world‘s largest nation without a state of their own. Their historic 
homeland was split among five countries by victors of World War I.245 
In contrast to the opening of dialogue on the legitimacy of Kurdish issues, the Minister of 
State for Human Rights Hikmet Sami Türk asserted on November 28, 1998 that 
recognition of Kurdish cultural rights was ―totally unacceptable‖ because it would further 
their goal of ―independence.‖246 As the domestic community began moderating and 
differentiating Kurdish political rights from PKK violence, Turkish policymakers still 
perceived any concessions to the Kurdish community as contributing to their historic 
separatist goals of statehood.  
5. International Support 
Rhetoric from Turkish leaders illustrates that during the PKK‘s campaign, 
Turkish leaders reacted to international support for the PKK through the lens of late 
Ottoman and early Republican interpretations of Kurdish nationalism and separatism. As 
outlined in Chapter II, the Sheik Said rebellion was believed to be fermented by British 
forces and multiple contemporary Turkish leaders have made connections between Sheik 
Said and Öcalan‘s campaign.247 One author categorizes the issue of Kurdish nationalism 
in the twenty-first century as a ―security issue with strong international links.‖248 The 
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international element embodies two important aspects of the Sèvres Syndrome: anxieties 
of territorial dismemberment and fear of Western incursion. The Turkish state uses these 
associations as confirmation that the West is using the Kurds as the internal collaborators 
to achieve the Sèvres goals of Turkish territorial dismemberment.249  
First, there is a perception in Turkey that PKK activities abroad constitute 
Western support and are part of an international proxy war against Turkey. Instead, it is 
more likely that the liberal political and cultural environment of Western Europe 
provided the PKK a refuge for militants, funding from prosperous members of the 
diaspora, and a base for propaganda promoting the ―benign‖ Kurdish cause. These efforts 
affirmed Kurds as a separate ethnic group with a unique history and language by Western 
powers, which contributed to Turkish shifts toward recognition of Kurds political and 
cultural rights.250 In Germany, the PKK was designated as a terrorist organization and 
banned in 1993. After a period of relative calm, however, the PKK‘s designation changed 
to a criminal organization which did not give Turkey the same protections against 
terrorist financing and organization.251 PKK operations within the liberal environments in 
Europe aggravated the Sèvres Syndrome and led Turkish leaders to believe that any 
European recommendation to solve the ―Kurdish Question‖ was not about cultural rights, 
but instead a conspiracy to dismember Turkey from within. 
Like its support of ASALA, Syria also provided robust support to the PKK as a 
hotbed for training camps and a safe haven for the leadership. PKK fighters operated 
within Syria and Syria-controlled Lebanon during the 1980s, and the PLO provided 
training support. By 1994, Öcalan claimed that 15,000 guerrilla fighters were trained in 
Syrian camps. Additionally, Syria provided Öcalan protection from arrest for the majority 
of PKK activities. Shortly after the PKK‘s formation, Öcalan fled Turkey and mainly 
remained in Syria from 1979 to his expulsion in October 1998 shortly before his arrest. 
The motivation for Syrian support was based on using the PKK as an instrument to assert 
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territorial claims on Turkey‘s Hatay province.252 Similar to ASALA, Syria supported the 
PKK as a foreign relations tool due to conflicts regarding Hatay and the Euphrates River. 
One scholar argues that ―Syrian support for the PKK was a means of extortion in the 
conflict about the waters of the Euphrates rather than an attempt to destroy the territorial 
integrity of the Turkish state.‖253 Although Syria perceived the PKK as a tool for foreign 
relations purposes, Turkey viewed Syrian support for the PKK through the lens of the 
Sèvres Syndrome. 
The Kurdish population in Iraq provided an important dimension for Turkish 
perceptions of Kurdish separatism. During the Iran-Iraq War, Turkey was a sanctuary for 
Kurds facing extermination from the Baathist regime. After the 1990—1991 Gulf War, 
Turkey aided American and British forces in creating and enforcing a no-fly zone over 
northern Iraq to provide Iraqi Kurds humanitarian protection from Saddam Hussein‘s 
regime. The PKK benefitted from two developments: first, Operation Provide 
Comfort/Operation Northern Watch created a safe haven for Iraqi Kurds; second, fighting 
between the two main Iraqi Kurdish leaders provided a steady flow of munitions and the 
PKK was able to operate freely in this newfound sanctuary.254 Unlike other states that 
supported the PKK, Turkey has been willing to take the offensive to engage in cross-
border attacks on PKK forces in Iraq. Under a 1984 agreement, both Turkey and Iraq are 
permitted to pursue Kurdish guerrillas six miles into the other state‘s territory. Since 
1984, Turkey intervened militarily into northern Iraq over fifty times under auspices of 
combating PKK militants and training camps.255  
In particular, Turkey‘s relations with Iraq are greatly influenced by the Sèvres 
Syndrome. The Kurds in Iraq enjoy a de facto autonomous state in northern Iraq 
complete with developed institutions and infrastructure since the 1970 agreement that 
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recognized Kurds as one of ―two nations of Iraq.‖256 Turkey fears that chaos within Iraq 
could lead to a partition, with the already developed Kurdish state achieving statehood. 
Additionally, the Kurdish region of Iraq serves as a model for the Kurdish separatists. As 
will be further discussed in Chapter IV, it was due to these perceptions that the Turkish 
government viewed the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq as another American ploy to 
strengthen Kurdish separatist forces in Iraq and also feared that American intervention 
could hasten the dissolution of Iraq.257 To balance Iraqi Kurdish movement toward 
autonomy, Turkey has made multiple statements throughout the past decades affirming 
its commitment to Iraq‘s territorial integrity and sovereignty. In 1995, the Turkish 
Ambassador to the United States declared that ―No country in the region and in the world 
is more sensitive than Turkey about the preservation of Iraq‘s territorial integrity.‖258 
Turkey‘s affirmation of Iraqi sovereignty has continued after the American invasion and 
Iraq through today, with the MFA publishing on their website that ―Turkey strong 
supports Iraq‘s sovereignty, stability, political unity and territorial integrity.‖259 
The overview of foreign patronage for the PKK gives the impression that support 
stems more from foreign states‘ willingness to capitalize on Turkey‘s unresolved internal 
issues than principled sponsorship of Kurdish cultural and territorial goals. In many 
situations, it can be argued that the tense relations between Turkey and its neighbors 
stimulated support for the PKK based on the premise of düşmanımın düşmanı 
dostumdur—―my enemy‘s enemy is my friend.‖ In turn, Turkey‘s reaction to domestic 
terrorism dictated foreign policy during the 1980s and 1990s. The lasting effects of these 
relations will be further explored in Chapter IV.  
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D. CONCLUSION 
An overview of ASALA and PKK terrorism illustrates that Turkey remains 
connected to its Ottoman past. Turkish leaders cling tightly to the late Ottoman and early 
Republican interpretations of separatism and foreign influence originated at Sèvres, 
keeping alive the destructive cycles of Ottoman separatism and irredentism that should 
have died at Lausanne. These interpretations of nationalist dissent remain relevant 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s. As evidenced by the rhetoric of both Turkish 
policymakers and the public, the goals, motivations, activities, and foreign support of 
both ASALA and the PKK have inflamed the Sèvres Syndrome within Turkey. Since 
Armenian and Kurdish issues were integral components of Sèvres, association with the 
treaty explains the propensity of the Turkish authorities to make unfounded connections 
between Ottoman and early Republican separatism and ASALA and PKK terrorism. 
This chapter illustrates that the Turkish desire for absolute protection of territory 
comes at the expense of minority rights. Instead of viewing ASALA and the PKK in the 
context of nationalism and cultural rights, the state instinctively frames these groups as 
existential threats to the state. Although the Armenians were a protected group within 
Turkey, ASALA‘s demand for recognition of the genocide strikes at the heart of Turkish 
anxieties due to the tense relations during World War I. Turkey‘s single-mindedness on 
territorial integrity further aggrieved Turkey‘s Kurdish population. Instead of allowing 
moderate political and cultural rights, most Turkish leaders and government authorities 
interpreted coexistence as infringing on state unity and the first step toward territorial 
loss. The denial of political and cultural rights instigated the creation of the PKK and 
cultivated widespread support from the wider Kurdish community. During this period, 
the Sèvres Syndrome labeled the entire minority group ―domestic enemies‖ even though 
they only represented a fraction of the population. This mindset allows the terrorist group 
to hijack the discussion, robbing both the state and the vast majority of moderates the 
ability to respond accurately to nationalist dissent. 
In addition, the Sèvres Syndrome has influenced Turkish foreign relations and 
prevented the normalization of relations with neighboring states. Despite ASALA‘s 
dissolution and PKK‘s military defeat, the belief that both groups were sustained by 
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outside influence allows Turkish policymakers and the public to deduce that Sèvres was 
not dead, but merely dormant. In both cases, foreign states did not provide active or 
passive support to the groups since they agreed with the goals or modus operandi. 
Instead, there is evidence that states used this support as a way to underhandedly assert 
their foreign policy. This lingering legacy from Sèvres prevents Turkey from developing 
sound relations with neighbors including Iraq, Armenia, Syria, and a host of European 
and Western states. 
During this period, policymaker reactions to ASALA and PKK terrorism were 
based in the Sèvres Syndrome and resulted in ineffective counterterrorism responses. 
Öcalan‘s capture in 1999 came just prior to the 2001 terrorist attacks that resulted in the 
influx of international support against terrorism. As seen in the next chapter, the 
trajectory of the Turkish counterterrorism response in the twenty-first century remains 
within the context of the Sèvres Syndrome and essentially unchanged from the late 
Ottoman and early Republican views of dissent evidenced in the 1970s and 1980s.  
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IV. NEW TERRORISM IN TURKEY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
At the turn of the twenty-first century, combating terrorism assumed new 
significance within global politics. Scholars described the rise of a ―new terrorism‖ with 
groups that exhibited novel goals, methods, and organization from earlier terrorist attacks 
and groups. Primarily, ―new terrorism‖ was identified by its religious justifications for 
political violence while ―old terrorism‖ focused on the national liberation and territorial 
goals.260 Within this typology, ASALA and PKK terrorism in Turkey could be 
categorized as old terrorism. In the last fifteen years, however, Turkey has witnessed a 
decline in attacks from domestic terrorism and a rise in religiously-motivated terrorist 
attacks. Instead of instigating ―new‖ terrorism within Turkey, the drawdown of violence 
after the PKK ceasefire spurred two trends. First, the defeat and weakening of older 
groups allowed for greater visibility for previously marginalized terrorist groups to wage 
attacks within Turkey. Second, the end of the military counterterrorism policies against 
the PKK provided the Turkish government an opening to vigorously pursue terrorist 
groups that were previously viewed as less significant. This was not an entirely new shift: 
during the 1990s, the Turkish military and police launched over 2,500 operations against 
Islamic terrorists and over 4,000 suspects were arrested and brought to trial.261 Attacks 
from international terror networks suggest a worrisome trend, but developments must be 
evaluated through the historical contextualization of Turkish leaders‘ perceptions. 
Rhetoric and reactions from Turkish policymakers suggest that ―new‖ terrorism is 
not perceived as the most significant threat to Turkey. Instead, Turkish policymakers and 
news media continue to identify separatist and nationalist groups as the foremost national 
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security concern and make connections to the late Ottoman and early Republican periods. 
Threat perceptions are elevated only when links are made between religiously-motivated 
terrorism and separatist groups in terms of the global war on terror. Therefore, many links 
can be made between Turkey‘s counterterrorism strategy in the twenty-first century and 
the historical apprehensions crystallized in the Treaty of Sèvres. This chapter builds on 
the psychological impacts of the twentieth century and illustrates how these residual fears 
continue to have enormous impact on the way Turkey frames and responds to both 
separatist and religious terrorism.  
First, the chapter will outline the trajectory of post-1999 PKK terrorism, 
government counterterrorism strategies, and illustrate how this threat continues to be 
framed by the Sèvres Syndrome. Next, the chapter will address the contemporary terrorist 
groups still active in Turkey, including the increased prominence of religiously-motivated 
groups, and the perception of these groups from Turkish policymakers and media. 
Although active within Turkey, these groups are viewed on the historical continuum of 
threats to Turkey‘s territorial integrity when connected to the PKK or separatist terrorism. 
Last, the chapter will focus on Turkey‘s perceptions of the global war on terror and 
illustrate how the perceived lack of American support against separatist terrorism 
inflames the Sèvres Syndrome.  
B. POST-1999 PERCEPTIONS OF SEPARATIST TERRORISM 
The tenor of Kurdish terrorism changed in the 1990s due to a combination of 
strong military repression and the capture of its powerful leader Abdullah Öcalan in 
1999. After his capture, Öcalan announced a ceasefire and decreed that the 2,000 PKK 
militants within Turkey retreat to Iraq and the senior PKK members turn themselves in 
for arrest and imprisonment. It is important to note that despite the ceasefire, Öcalan 
adeptly retained his relevance and value by not ordering the PKK to disband or disarm.262 
The PKK emerged from this period and began to seek its goals through diplomatic means 
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and fight for a democratic Turkey that would unify Turks and Kurds as equals.263 
Following Öcalan‘s capture, the PKK underwent multiple name changes: in 2002 it 
adopted Congress for Freedom and Democracy in Kurdistan (KADEK), in 2004 renewed 
as Congress of Kurdistan Public (KONGRA-GEL), and in 2005, Kurdish militant and 
nationalist groups united under the umbrella movement Kurdistan Communities Union 
(KCK). Despite the new names and pledges for a political solution, the strategy, 
activities, and militants remained largely the same and Turkish officials remain 
convinced that separatism is still the group‘s ultimate goal.264 
The PKK‘s reforms initially appeared to have a beneficial effect on the level of 
violence. PKK attacks were virtually nonexistent between 1999 and the PKK declaring 
an end to the ceasefire in 2003.265 Despite the disarray among the rank and file of the 
PKK, the Kurdish People‘s Democracy Party (HADEP) was made up of Kurdish 
sympathizers and the group won the majority of the elections in southeastern Turkey in 
the early 2000s and kept the PKK pertinent during this period. During this period, 
Kurdish-language media transformed Öcalan‘s imprisonment into a symbol of Kurdish 
repression. These developments occurred during a period where Ankara claimed victory 
over the PKK due to the ceasefire and decreased violence, but only made limited 
concessions for Kurdish political and cultural rights. For example, a law permitting 
Kurdish-language broadcasting was passed in 2002, but the requisite regulatory laws to 
allow the broadcasting through the state-run station was postponed for another two years. 
Ultimately, the PKK returned to violence in June 2004 when Öcalan called an end to the 
ceasefire. The return to violence is attributed to claims that the Turkish state was 
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irresponsive to its peace initiatives, protests of Öcalan‘s treatment in prison, and the 
desire to assert the PKK‘s relevance.266 
Devoid of political discourse, PKK violence swung from shaky truces to erratic 
terrorist attacks on civilians and raids on government assets. The Turkish government 
resurrected past failed deterrent policies of repression with air strikes on PKK 
strongholds in northern Iraq and a ground offensive in February 2008. By 2009, the 
Justice and Development Party (AKP) initiated the Democratic Opening and sought to 
win Kurdish public opinion by launching a state-run twenty-four-hour Kurdish language 
television station. Concurrently, members of the Turkish National Intelligence 
Organization (MİT) and PKK representatives initiated peace talks in a serious effort to 
resolve the conflict through peaceful means. Despite promises from the AKP platform in 
the 2011 parliamentary elections and the election of a record number of Kurdish 
parliamentarians, this détente deteriorated as brief episodes of violence from both sides 
that hardened both Turkish and Kurdish public opinions.267 
A significant turning point was in October 2011 when the PKK killed twenty-four 
Turkish soldiers in a massive attack. Turkey launched a massive offensive in southeastern 
Turkey and northern Iraq with 10,000 troops and air support.268 Attacks continued to 
escalate and in 2012, Kurdish prisoners, activists, and politicians alike underwent a 
hunger strike that only ended after a personal appeal from Öcalan.269 In 2013, another 
round of talks between Öcalan and MİT concluded when Öcalan announced a ceasefire 
and ordered PKK militants to withdraw from Turkey. Despite the initial jubilant news 
within Turkey and the international community, the PKK announced it had stopped 
withdrawing militants from Turkey due to claims that Turkish government reforms 
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promised in the ceasefire agreement were not implemented.270 Turkish policymakers 
perceive the struggle against the PKK to be Turkey‘s main domestic problem. In 2009, 
President Gül stated, ―Whether you call it a terror problem, a south-eastern Anatolia 
problem or a Kurdish problem, this is the first question for Turkey. It has to be 
solved.‖271 
1. Responses to Terrorism 
The nature of Turkish counterterrorism strategy was greatly influenced by the 
nationalist and territorial anxieties informed from future experiences with separatism and 
minority groups. Instead of defaulting to political or diplomatic instruments for 
counterterrorism, the historic perception of terrorism logically engaged the Turkish 
military as the primary state apparatus used to combat the PKK. Between World War II 
and its participation in International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) missions in 
Afghanistan, the Turkish military was solely focused on Kurdish militants other than 
brief engagements in the Korean War and the 1974 invasion of Cyprus. In Turkey‘s case, 
domestic terrorism likely curtailed the state‘s ability to initiate democratic reforms 
because policymakers‘ sole focus was national defense against a seemingly existential 
threat.272 As illustrated in Chapter III, the military utilized deterrent policies such as 
incapacitation, military force, and anti-terrorism laws. Ironically, terrorism peaked in the 
1990s, but it was the military that ultimately triumphed to defeat, but not eliminate, PKK 
terrorism.273 Based on quantitative evidence, these state policies did not result in a 
sustainable deterrent on PKK violence. Instead, a weakened PKK pragmatically adapted 
to the new operational realities and pursued a strategy of selective and limited violence. 
While the deterrent policies allowed the Turkish state to claim victory by preventing 
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Kurdish secession and statehood, these same policies did not put a stop to the violence.274 
As with previous military operations, these policies prove ineffective toward fostering 
lasting peace in Turkey and continue to perpetrate the cycle of military operations 
followed by short-lived ceasefires. In response to the 2011 military operations, analyst 
Hugh Pope stated, ―We have been down this road many times before…Politicians might 
say they can hit the P.K.K. out of the park this time, but it never has worked and it never 
can work.‖275 As will be illustrated in the next section, Turkish policymakers‘ 
perceptions of contemporary terrorism dictated the counterterrorism policy.  
Outside of the military option, Turkey has pursued anti-defiance counterterrorism 
policies with varying degrees of commitment and success. Only upon witnessing a 
weakened PKK was Turkey able to realize that PKK could not be fought through military 
means alone. The 2003 election of the AKP and Prime Minister Erdoğan provided an 
opening for Kurdish rights independent of PKK hegemony over the issue. Erdoğan‘s 
government built on President Turgut Özal‘s 1992 approach that sought to combat the 
PKK through improving socioeconomic conditions in southeastern Turkey and expanding 
Kurdish rights. These linguistic and cultural policies include allowance of Kurdish 
languages, abolition of the anti-Kurdish laws, and recognition of Nevruz. In his 2005 
speech in Diyarbakır, Erdoğan promoted cultural pluralism under the umbrella of Turkish 
unity, admitted previous mistakes on Kurdish issues, and promised to implement 
measures bolstering Kurdish rights.276 These measures sought to address the Kurdish 
population‘s legitimate grievances rather than indiscriminate anti-defiance policies. 
While these measures have reduced violence in the short-run and improved political 
opinion in the Kurdish community, there is no quantitative evidence that the anti-defiance 
policies had a deterrent effect on PKK violence.277 
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Despite the Kurdish opening, both rhetoric and policy illustrates that the Turkish 
military establishment has not embraced the shift in counterterrorism strategy. After 
Öcalan‘s capture, the General Chief of Staff issued a declaration admonishing supporters 
of Kurdish cultural rights as ―[speaking] the same tongue as the PKK.‖278 The past 
decade was categorized by contradictory policies: at times, AKP sends positive signals by 
engaging in Kurdish cultural reforms; during others, the government unleashes the 
military against the PKK and takes steps to subdue peaceful expressions of Kurdish 
nationalism.279 Turkish military leaders continue to take a hard line against the PKK with 
general beliefs categorized by statements similar to General İlker Başbuğ: military 
operations will be ongoing until ―the last terrorist is neutralized.‖280 Opponents still exist 
who maintain that these rights will lead to the dismemberment of Turkey. In a 2007 
interview, former Chief of General Staff Gen. Güreş communicated his beliefs that 
Kurdish rights are institutionalized, but they will have a negative effect on the unitary 
nature of the state and the preservation of Turkish identity.281 In another example, 
General Evren admitted in 2007 that the ban on Kurdish languages in the 1982 
constitution was a ―mistake,‖ but retained his belief Turkish must remain the official 
language.282 These interviews illustrate that top military leadership recognizes that anti-
defiance policies and cultural allowances are the best strategy, but entrenched territorial 
anxieties prevent full adoption of these measures.  
Many factors outside of the range of counterterrorism policies and Kurdish 
nationalism hinder the elimination of PKK terrorism. Southeastern Turkey is plagued 
with endemic underdevelopment, mountainous territory that complicates trade and 
access, and neighboring states with unstable governments and rampant civil wars. While 
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these conditions may have fostered and facilitated the emergence of Kurdish terrorism, 
they do not explain or justify terrorism.283 Instead, PKK terrorism has likely contributed 
to the economic crisis in the southeast by driving away tourism and investment 
opportunities. Öcalan accepts these realities and recently stated that from an economic 
perspective, Kurds cannot viable establish their own state and their survival is linked to 
the Turkish economy.284 
2. Counterterrorism Strategies through the Lens of Sèvres 
Overall, Turkish counterterrorism policy could generally be considered a success. 
Although these policies have failed to end PKK violence, Turkish counterterrorism 
policies have militarily defeated the PKK, forced the group to limit its goals, shifted its 
strategy of violence, and changed its ideology. All of these concessions were achieved 
without Turkey‘s greatest fear coming to fruition: since the onset of PKK violence, 
Turkey never lost control over any of the territory granted in the Treaty of Lausanne.285 
While cultural and political rights could function similarly to Cypriots, Greeks, and 
Armenians within Turkey, it has proven politically difficult for AKP policymakers to 
harmonize increasing public support for Kurdish nationalism without the perception that 
it is endangering Turkish sovereignty. Although the post-1999 PKK seeks Kurdish 
political and cultural rights, the peace process has been overshadowed by the Turkish 
preoccupation of protecting the territorial integrity of the state. These biases are 
especially challenging to overcome since decades of war and mixed messages have 
institutionalized the conviction that Turkish Kurds seek an independent state.286 It is easy 
for critics to call for a political issue to the ―Kurdish problem,‖ but there no viable road 
map or solution has been proposed that deals with the deep-rooted problems while not 
compounding past grievances.287 
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Although it seems counterintuitive for Turkey to continue to use military force as 
a counterterrorism strategy after it achieved more success with anti-defiance strategies, 
the reason is rooted on the same historical continuum. Since Turkey viewed the PKK as a 
continuation of the Kurdish separatist revolts in the early Republican period, the Turkish 
military initially responded to PKK violence through similar means. The military is the 
primary state instrument for national security and protection of territorial integrity and 
decades of military-centric counterterrorism policies have further ingrained the Sèvres 
Syndrome. The survey of literature in Chapter I illustrates that few in the academic 
community make direct connections between the Treaty of Sèvres—which is extensively 
documented—and the Turkish reactions to PKK terrorism. The anxieties born at Sèvres 
are still present in discussions on counterterrorism. Contemporary Turkish leaders and 
news editorials make references to the symptoms of the Sèvres Syndrome even if the 
treaty is not explicitly mentioned.  
First, the Sèvres Syndrome‘s fear of territorial dismemberment and domestic 
separatism is evident in reactions by contemporary Turkish politicians and news outlets 
pertaining to counterterrorism. Pointedly, then-President Demirel stated that the West is 
―trying to involve the Sèvres Treaty to set up a Kurdish state in the region.‖288 In 2007, 
retired General Aytaç Yalman viewed the PKK‘s existence as part of a three step process: 
suppression, militarization, and politicization. If the PKK‘s struggle is able to escalate to 
the politicization stage, this would be ―most dangerous of all‖ to ―Turkey‘s unity and 
territorial integrity.‖ 289 He did acknowledge that this could only be achieved if full rights 
for Kurdish identity were permitted and not viewed as ―destructive‖—seemingly 
impossible in a nationalist society where Turks are conditioned in ―reflexive patriotism‖ 
through the education system and the media.290 Some scholars even contend that the 
PKK has not truly embraced this change of strategy; instead, it is utilizing selective 
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violence complemented with political strategies to first achieve political compromises 
and then seek autonomy, confederation, and ultimately Kurdish statehood.291 
Second, the belief that the PKK is a source of Western intervention is also present 
in contemporary reactions. Top policymakers have expressed that the West‘s promotion 
of a political solution with the Kurds is a foreign-inspired plot. Prime Minister Ecevit 
stated that a Kurdish problem does not exist within Turkey, but PKK terrorism is 
supported by foreign states seeking to divide Turkey.292 After the 2001 terrorist attacks in 
New York and Washington, DC, U.S. activities in the Middle East increased and Turkey 
became an important transit hub for operations in Iraq. In its desire to keep Iraq stable for 
military actions, the United States pledged to defend Turkey against the PKK. In 2007, 
President Bush declared that PKK was an ―enemy to the U.S.‖ and followed through with 
his pledge to provide ―actionable intelligence‖ to Turkey.293 Despite the PKK‘s stated 
change in goals and the U.S. commitment to supporting Turkey‘s efforts against the 
PKK, rhetoric from the Turkish military community still demonstrates the pervasiveness 
of the Sèvres Syndrome. In a 2007 interview, former Chief of General Staff Gen. Güreş 
expressed a disbelief in the authenticity in both. His claim that ―we see maps depicting a 
divided Turkey‖ illustrations his perception that the PKK was still threatening Turkish 
territorial integrity and the United States was a key player in the conspiracy to create a 
Kurdish state.294 Instead of focusing on the U.S. counterterrorism policies that supported 
Turkey against the PKK, military leaders choose to believe that Western states continue 
to support Kurdish intentions to dismember Turkey. For example, Gen. Güreş stated: 
―What are [the U.S.] goals? For Turkey to become smaller. My fear is that one day 
someone will say ‗It‘s too much of a headache. Let‘s get rid of it.‘‖295  
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Over a decade into the twenty-first century, many in Turkey and the region view 
the inability to overcome these symptoms of the Sèvres Syndrome as the root of the 
problems with the PKK. While in Turkey as a guest of President Gül in 2010, Syrian 
President Bashar al-Assad stated, ―The PKK is not today‘s problem. You can follow it 
back all the way to Sèvres.‖ He claimed that Turkey needed to provide assurances to 
Kurds that they could live in Turkey as equals while expressing their ethnicity, but also 
uphold the citizenship requirements of a united country.296 The Sèvres Syndrome is also 
frequently the topic of articles in Turkish media. In a recent article discussing then-Prime 
Minister Erdoğan‘s August 2014 presidency bid, the author speculated the effect of 
Erdoğan‘s Kurdish opening on the Turkish public. Despite his good intentions, the scope 
of Erdoğan‘s Kurdish opening will be bounded by the fact that ―almost everyone on these 
lands agonizingly remembers the fate of the Ottoman Empire, which disintegrated and 
eventually collapsed because all of its autonomous regions declared their 
independence.‖297 The inability to overcome the anxiety of disintegration and collapse 
from the end of the Ottoman Empire continues to dictate Turkish counterterrorism policy 
toward the PKK and the Kurds.  
C. RELIGIOUSLY-MOTIVATED TERRORISM IN TURKEY 
Less pervasive and ubiquitous than the PKK attacks, terrorist groups that point to 
religion as their motivating factor have historically existed within Turkey and are still 
active today. Terrorism in Turkey is synonymous with the PKK, but the Turkish 
experience proves that ―outmoded Marxist extremism, separatist nationalism and 
religious terrorism flourish in the same environment.‖298 Radical Islamic ideology 
appeared in Turkey during the 1970s. After the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, many 
Turkish Islamic scholars traveled travel to Iran and imported Salafist ideology upon their 
return. The 1981 military coup and subsequent transition to democracy opened Turkish 
borders to Islamic publications from through the region that were quickly translated into 
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Turkish. The military‘s censorship and societal control kept the radical Islamic groups 
underground but they maintained their resilience. When al-Qaeda gained worldwide 
attention in the 1990s, there were already established networks of Salafist sympathizers 
within hotspots such as Gaziantep, Konya, and Istanbul.299 While Turkish society is 
frequently applauded for its natural ―immunizations‖ against religious terrorism—the 
existence of another terror group for extremists to join, the role of the government with 
the Ministry of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), and integration and prominence of Islamic 
groups into the secular Turkish politics—the environment still exists for religion to be 
manipulated for political purposes. 300 
The three main groups operating within Turkey that claim religion, not 
nationalism or leftist ideology, as their motivation are the Kurdish Hizbollah, İBDA-C, 
and al-Qaeda in Turkey. DHKP/C has also committed multiple suicide attacks in the past 
decade, with a prominent attack on the U.S. Embassy in Ankara.301 Since it espouses a 
Marxist-Leninist anti-American and anti-NATO ideology, it will not be included in this 
study. This section illustrates that Turkish perceptions of terrorism remain rooted in the 
anxieties born at Sèvres, with policymakers‘ rhetoric and reaction increasing when the 
groups are linked to nationalist terrorism. Connections between the PKK and ―new‖ 
terrorism evoke fears of territorial dismemberment and Western intervention that skew 
Ankara‘s foreign relations within the region and on the international stage.  
1. Kurdish Hizbollah 
Hizbollah was active in Iran since the 1979 Revolution and first emerged in the 
Turkish Kurdish community in 1983. Kurdish Hizbollah operated and launched violent 
attacks with Turkey during the 1980s and 1990s, but appeared to decline after their 
leader, İrfan Çağırıcı, was imprisoned in 1996. There are no known ties between the 
Lebanese Hizbollah and Kurdish Hizbollah in Turkey because the Lebanese group is 
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Shiite and the Turkish group is Sunni. Kurdish Hizbollah describes a loose arrangement 
of terrorist groups within Turkey—so loose that the terrorists themselves do not even 
identify under this name. Instead, the groups are held together by claims of religion as the 
motivation and justification for their political violence. The targets of this network have 
been other Islamic groups, the PKK, mercenary assassinations (mainly contracted 
through Iran), and prominent secular members of Turkish society. The most publicized 
attacks have been against journalists, academics, and artists through targeted killings, 
kidnappings, and arson. A key figure in Turkey was Hüseyin Velioğlu, an extremist 
wanted for attempting to overthrow the secular Turkish government and replace with an 
Islamic regime. He reportedly had traveled to Iran for political and military training from 
the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and was killed in Istanbul in 2000.302 Police raids on 
Hizbollah in January 2000 raised public awareness on group activities, including the 
discovery of kidnapped victims buried alive and tortured to death.303  
Kurdish Hizbollah was founded partly on the basis of opposing the PKK‘s 
message rather than purely religious goals. During the 1990s, Kurdish Hizbollah engaged 
in what could be categorized as a civil war against the PKK in southeastern Turkey. 
Although the Turkish government opposed both groups, its counterterrorism strategy 
sought to defeat the PKK before eliminating the Kurdish Hizbollah. In the words of the 
governor of Diyarbakır, the Turkish state did not support the group, ―but it may have look 
at Hizbullah sympathetically‖ and did not dedicate major resources to eliminating 
Hizbollah.304 After reports that Kurdish Hizbollah and the PKK signed a ceasefire and 
united to join forces against the state in 1993, the connection to the PKK spurred the state 
to genuinely combat religious terrorism. Between 1990—2002, over 4,000 Islamist 
militant suspects had been arrested and sent to trial.305 This trajectory illustrates that the 
change in the Turkish government‘s resolve was not prompted by the severity of the 
attacks, but instead in the quest to eliminate PKK through any means possible.  
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2. İBDA-C 
İBDA-C was formed in the 1970s as an Islamic youth organization with the 
Sunni-Salafi ideology, opposing the secular Turkish government and rule of law. The 
group moved to violence in the 1990s and mainly conducts bombings of secular or non-
Islamic targets such as places of worship and establishments selling alcohol.306 İBDA-C 
appeared to be on the decline after its leader, Sahil Erdiş (also known as Sahil 
Mirzabeyoğlu) was arrested in 1998. Conversely, the group adapted and adopted the 
strategy of ―leaderless resistance‖ or ―leaderless jihad.‖307 The group now operates 
without central leadership or hierarchical authority and militants are encouraged to act on 
behalf of İBDA-C and select their own targets. Unlike the prolific nature of Kurdish 
Hizbollah terrorism, İBDA-C achieved a low level of effectiveness and success until 
2003.308  
On November 15 and November 20, 2003, four truck bombs detonated in Istanbul 
collectively killing fifty-eight people and injuring 750. Targets included two synagogues, 
the British Consulate (killing the counsel general), and a branch of the London-based 
HSBC Bank. Although the attacks targeted American and Israeli interests, many Turkish 
citizens were killed.309 The Islamic militant group İBDA-C originally took responsibility, 
but the investigation illustrated that the ringleaders and perpetrators had ties to al-Qaeda 
and Kurdish Hizbollah. The attacks were carried out by a group of Turks already 
radicalized and organized into a terrorist cell that was not in direct contact with al-Qaeda. 
These terrorists had a weak, most likely nominal, connection with al-Qaeda core.310 
These fighters instead shared a similar profile to many al-Qaeda fighters—particularly 
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their training at camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The group did not share all of al-
Qaeda‘s grievances or goals, but they shared objections of oppression of Muslims and a 
willingness to strike American and Israeli targets. Gaining financial support and logistical 
assistance, preparations for this attack were reportedly approved directly by al-Qaeda 
leader Osama bin Laden a week before September 11, 2001 in what might have been his 
last personal authorization.311 The 2003 Istanbul bombings were the first clear evidence 
that al-Qaeda had a presence in Turkey with the perpetrators living and financing the 
attacks domestically.312 Up to this point, this was the most significant single terrorist 
attack on Turkish territory. Unlike reactions to PKK terrorism, the Turkish government 
increased police activity against the group and did not resort to military action. 
3. Al-Qaeda 
Unlike states in the broader Middle East and North Africa region, there is no 
separate ―Turkish al-Qaeda‖ branch. Instead, al-Qaeda consistently utilizes established 
local radical Islamist organizations within Turkey to carry out attacks without any 
targeting assistance, funding, or direct leadership guidance from senior leadership. In 
Turkey, Kurdish Hizbollah appears to have a direct connection with foreign al-Qaeda 
militants, while the İBDA-C is aligned through ideology.313 There is evidence that al-
Qaeda also utilizes the Kurdish Hizbollah networks in Turkey to move people and funds 
from Europe to Syria, Iraq, and greater Middle East operations.314 Consistent with other 
Islamic groups within Turkey, these aligned groups are largely decentralized and operate 
independently with the connection between al-Qaeda core and Turkish militants thought 
to be weak and most likely nominal. Although there is no official data due to clandestine 
travel, it is estimated that a very small number of Turkish citizens have traveled to Arab 
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countries for training or to serve as foreign fighters. Consequently, no Turks are known to 
be in the top echelons of al-Qaeda.315  
Within Turkey, PKK and al-Qaeda share a symbiotic relationship in order to 
conduct attacks. First, al-Qaeda has attempted to exploit the violence and disorder created 
by the Kurdish conflict as a cover for their movement and to divert attention from its 
cells. Second, Kurds have also doubled as al-Qaeda fighters. The PKK has benefitted 
from the al-Qaeda presence by adopting similar tactics, but it is unclear whether al-Qaeda 
militants have mentored or taught radical Kurdish organizations. One example is the 
PKK‘s use of suicide bombings which could either be from direct training or observing 
al-Qaeda‘s previous successes with suicide bombings.316  
The government‘s experience with the PKK has led to strong counterterrorism 
measures against all forms of terrorism, including al-Qaeda.317 Since al-Qaeda is a highly 
decentralized and largely indistinguishable network, the state utilizes law enforcement 
methods rather than deterrent military measures. The Turkish police has been largely 
successful in thwarting al-Qaeda attacks and carrying out large numbers of arrests of 
suspected al-Qaeda sympathizers and militants. Thwarted plots include an attack on 
İncirlik Base in 2003, the Istanbul NATO summit in 2004 attended by President Bush, 
and the U.S. Embassy in Ankara during Security of State Clinton‘s visit in 2011. Turkish 
police also conduct routine operations and mass arrests of al-Qaeda members and 
sympathizers. Throughout 2009 and 2012, the Turkish police conducted multiple raids 
across the country foiling multiple attacks in multiple stages of planning and arresting 
people suspected with al-Qaeda links.318 The Turkish government has failed to 
adequately combat al-Qaeda terrorism that does not have a connection to separatism or 
foreign conspiracies to undermine Turkey‘s territorial integrity. Instead of combating al-
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Qaeda terrorists with the same fervor as PKK terrorists within its borders, Erdoğan has 
pledged to ―wage the same fight against all separatist terrorist groups if there were such 
groups [on Turkish soil].‖319 Al-Qaeda is not a separatist group and does not inflame the 
same historical anxieties that trigger massive counterterror responses.  
4. Islamic State 
As the threat from religiously-motivated terrorism continues to evolve and adapt, 
it is important to study the consistency and trajectory of Ankara‘s perceptions of 
terrorism within and near its borders. At the time of publication, both the Syrian and Iraqi 
governments are unable to retain a monopoly over the use of force and exert sovereignty 
over their territory. Despite its former close relations with Syrian president Bashar al-
Assad, Turkey broke off relations in 2011 and based its policy toward Syria on the 
downfall of the Assad regime.320 After the change in policy, Turkey provided the Syrian 
opposition and Jabhat al-Nusra access to Turkish territory as a safe haven for foreign 
fighters and opened its borders to smuggled weapons. There are allegations that Turkey 
supports al-Qaeda-linked groups that are ―‗friendly‘ jihadists‖ and the ethnic Turkish 
Turkmen in Syrian since they oppose the Syrian regime.321 Tensions increased conflict 
moved into military realm with a Turkish reconnaissance aircraft shot down by Syria in 
2012, bringing the two countries dangerously close to war. In the deadliest terror attack 
on Turkish territory, two bombs exploded in Reyhanlı in May 2013 and killed fifty-three 
people. Turkey blamed this attack on proxies acting on behalf of Syrian intelligence.322 
Turkey only declared Jabhat al-Nusra a terrorist organization six months after the United 
States, holding out hope that the group would be the most effective tool to remove the 
Assad regime and defeat the Syrian army. Out of this disarray, the Islamic State—a Sunni 
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jihadist group with tenuous ties to al-Qaeda—gained influence and territory throughout 
the Levant region in a quest to establish the Caliphate.323 
Since Assad has proven his staying power, Turkey has reversed its policy of open 
borders and maintains a complex relationship with the Islamic State. Violence plagues 
the region with multiple instances of Turkish civilians killed by stray shells in cities along 
the border since 2011. In addition, an onslaught of over a million Syrian refugees have 
flooded Turkey‘s border areas, costing the government over $3 billion and straining the 
capabilities of the domestic humanitarian response infrastructure.324 Commentators assert 
that Turkey‘s negligent policies created the conditions that allowed the Islamic State to 
flourish in both Iraq and Syria without implementing serious counterterrorism policies to 
combat the group.325 Consistent with earlier manifestations of terrorism, Ankara‘s 
perceptions of the Islamic State have led to a skewed policy rooted more in historical 
territorial anxieties than the contemporary realities. For example, Erdoğan‘s campaign for 
president in August 2014 focused on the Gaza crisis, with critics arguing that the 
campaign steered clear of counterterrorism to avoid embarrassment from the failed 
Syrian policy. Turkey has not designated the Islamic State as a terrorist organization and 
instead refers to it as an ―entity‖ with then-Foreign Minister Davutoğlu defining it as a 
―radical organization with a terrorist-like structure.‖ 326  
During this period, Turkish reactions focused more on supporting any group that 
could stem the tide of Kurdish separatism rather than the national security threat 
developing at its border. There were persistent allegations and speculation throughout 
2014 of Ankara‘s logistical support to terrorist groups operating within Syria. Turkey has 
been accused of supporting the Islamic State for two main reasons: as a tool to topple the 
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Assad regime and as a strategy to align the state with PKK-opposition groups. While 
seemingly separate goals, both aim to prevent autonomous Kurdish rule in Syria that 
would encourage Kurdish separatism within Turkey. President Assad‘s refusal to step 
down after Erdoğan‘s warning in 2011 publically demonstrated the limits of Turkey‘s 
influence in the Middle East and Erdoğan distanced himself from his former ally.327 The 
continuing Syrian civil war and the lack of a centralized government increases the chance 
that Kurds could gain autonomous control over Syrian territory. Turkey has also 
allegedly extended its support to the Islamic State as it threatened Kurdish regions of 
Iraq, but this strategy backfired as the PKK and the Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party 
(KDP) joined in a military alliance, strengthening the PKK.328 These trends illustrate that 
Turkish policymakers consistently view terrorism as part of the historical continuum of 
separatism and threats to the territorial integrity even as Turkey‘s main threat on the Iraqi 
borders shift from Kurds to Sunni extremists and the Turkish peace negotiations with the 
PKK continues to mature. 
While developments in Syria directly threaten Turkey‘s national security with 
violence spilling over the border, the unfolding scenario in Iraq aggravates Turkey‘s 
Sèvres Syndrome. In June 2014, Islamic State militants gained control of Mosul—an 
episode referred to as the fall of Mosul in Turkey. Soon after, Islamic militants took 49 
Turkish nationals hostage, including all of the diplomatic staff at the Turkish consulate in 
Mosul. By seizing control of the consulate that has no strategic leverage, the militants are 
asserting their control over the territory and could be using the hostages for political 
purposes.329 Mosul‘s fall to Islamic militants is significant due to the wider trajectory of 
militant activities, but Turkey‘s irredentist claims raise the gravity of these developments. 
Foreign Minister Davutoğlu‘s stance toward these Islamic groups has stiffened, stating 
―Nobody should test Turkey‘s resolve‖ and the Turkish government has threatened 
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military force.330 Ironically, when Kirkuk was captured by Kurdish forces, it was 
welcomed as a seemingly positive alternative to falling under the control of Islamic 
forces. Only a few years prior, Kurdish control over Kirkuk would have been a redline 
for Turkey due to former Turkish claims over the territory and the strengthening of Iraqi 
Kurdistan.331 The Islamic State also directly challenged Turkish sovereignty and 
territorial integrity when it threated to destroy the tomb of Şüleyman Shah, the 
grandfather of the Ottoman Empire‘s founder Sultan Osman. Turkey retains claims over 
this territory based on the 1921 Treaty of Ankara, and Turkish soldiers and the Turkish 
flag symbolically protect the tomb. Foreign Minister Davutoğlu promised retaliation after 
the tomb incident, despite the March 2014 attack on Niğde province by foreign fighters 
and multiple other attacks with Turkish borders.332  
Turkey has been referred to as the ―lone gatekeeper‖ as the Syrian and Iraqi 
governments crumble and are unable to conduct counterterrorism operations.333 Still, 
Turkish commentators view Turkey‘s Syria policy as a failed effort leaving Turkey with 
few options other than aligning with Western counterterrorism policies. At the time of 
publication, U.S. policy had shifted to reversing the gains of al-Qaeda and Islamist 
militant groups in Syria rather than overthrowing the regime and confronting the post-
Assad vacuum. Consistent with the Sèvres Syndrome, Turkish policymakers fear Western 
intervention and point to the lack of Western support as the reason that radical groups are 
thriving. In line with Turkish perceptions of the global war on terror, policymakers 
believe they are not provided adequate Western support and as one Turkish official 
stated, ―we do our best…Turkey cannot control this (alone).‖334 NATO has pledged to 
defend and protect Turkey, but efforts remain short of full military defense. In an official 
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visit to Turkey, NATO Secretary-General Rasmussen highlighted the alliance‘s 2012 
demonstration of solidarity through the deployment of Patriot missiles to defend its 
airspace from Syrian attacks. Turkey, however, has not asked for the activation of Article 
5 of the NATO Treaty and continues to rely largely on rhetorical protections from its 
international allies.335 
D. TURKEY AND THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR 
As Turkey contributes to the American-led global war on terror, the Sèvres 
Syndrome remains relevant and influences its perception of terrorism and 
counterterrorism within Turkey.336 In the immediate aftermath of the 2001 terrorist 
attacks in New York City and Washington, DC, Turkey supported United Nations 
Security Council resolutions 1368 and 1373. As a NATO member, Turkey played a key 
role in the ISAF strikes on Taliban forces in Afghanistan. The Turkish Parliament‘s 
decision to bar NATO from using Turkish territory to open a northern front in Iraq 
surprised American policymakers and led to a crisis in U.S.-Turkish relations.337 As a 
partner in the global war on terror, Turkey had high expectations for international support 
against separatist terrorism within its borders. The United States had framed the global 
war on terror as an inclusive attack on all forms of terrorism—not limited to al-Qaeda. 
The realization that American support against the PKK would be limited has kindled 
conspiracy theories of a U.S.-sponsored ―Greater Middle East Project‖ in the face of a 
crumbling Iraq.338 
The inclusive nature of the global war on terror framework appeared to provide 
Turkey promising advances in its previously solitary struggle against the PKK. Turkish 
leaders sought to highlight that terrorism within Turkey did not begin in 2001 and Turkey 
has historically fought terrorism with little international support. In 2001, former foreign 
                                                 
335 Deniz Arslan, ―Rasmussen Assures Turkey: NATO Won‘t Hesitate to Defend Its Ally,‖ Today’s 
Zaman, June 17, 2014.  
336 ―Global war on terror‖ refers to the international military campaigns aimed to defeat al-Qaeda in 
the aftermath of the 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States.   
337 Migdalovitz. Iraq: Turkey, the Deployment of U.S. Forces, and Related Issues. 
338 Kaya, ―A Different War on Terrorism,‖ Long War Journal. 
 98 
minister İsmail Cem credits decades of Western misunderstandings and prejudices to 
Turkey‘s struggle with ethnic and separatist terrorism.339 In 2004, Prime Minister 
Erdoğan stated that ―I am the prime minister of a country which has lost 40,000 victims 
to terror‖ highlights how the international community‘s selectivity on which groups to 
support is ironic.340 In a promising 2007 meeting between President Bush and Prime 
Minister Erdoğan at the White House, the leaders discussed their common goals for the 
global war on terror. President Bush proclaimed that the PKK was ―an enemy of 
Turkey…an enemy of Iraq, and …an enemy of the United States‖ and articulated the 
need to ―protect ourselves from the PKK.‖ Additionally, Prime Minister Erdoğan stressed 
that the United States was a strategic partner in both international terrorism and efforts to 
combat PKK terrorism.341 
Although the international community relentlessly pursued al-Qaeda on the global 
stage and the number of deaths from Islamic terrorism increased within Turkey, 
statements made by Turkish policymakers illustrate their belief that PKK terrorism still 
poses the greatest threat to Turkey‘s security.342 At the 2004 NATO Summit in Istanbul, 
Erdoğan highlighted European barriers to labeling the PKK as a terrorist organization and 
the international community‘s lack of commitment to tackling PKK terrorism within Iraq. 
In July 2004, then-Foreign Minister Gül urged neighboring foreign ministers to 
strengthen efforts against ―certain terrorist groups on Iraqi soil [that] constitute a threat to 
that country‘s neighbors.‖343  
The global war on terror provided the united international front necessary to 
weaken religiously-motivated terrorism within Turkey; however, PKK violence continues 
essentially unabated. There was a brief uptick of international support after the 2003 
Istanbul bombings, but overall support for PKK terrorism without al-Qaeda connections 
remained low. In 2003, the European Union issued a statement that reiterated ―its 
                                                 
339 Quoted in Mango, Turkey and the War on Terror, 87. 
340 Quoted in Ibid., 86. 
341 U.S. Department of State Archive, ―President Bush and Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan Discuss 
Global War on Terror,‖ Washington, DC, November 5, 2007.  
342 Mango, Turkey and the War on Terror, 78.  
343 Ibid., 79. 
 99 
solidarity with Turkey and reaffirms its determination to defeat terrorism together with 
others in the international community and to provide a common response to this global 
threat.‖344 By 2004, the PKK and its affiliated organizations and the İBDA-C were added 
to the EU‘s list of banned terrorist organizations. Despite these outward pronouncements, 
Turkey still had difficulty in extraditing suspected terrorists arrested abroad. Perceived as 
European support for Kurdish terrorism, Turkey was also unable to curtail European 
dissemination and funding of Kurdish-language media stations. The seeming 
unwillingness of the international community to make the full commitment to eradicating 
the PKK contributes to the perpetuation of the Sèvres Syndrome. Aliza Marcus aptly 
assessed, ―the United States has said it is fighting a global war on terror, yet it refuses to 
fight the PKK.‖345  
As a continuation of the foreign policy trends highlighted in Chapter II, Turkish 
policymakers viewed the U.S. invasion of Iraq as the opening of another front in the 
Western conspiracy to weaken the territorial integrity of Iraq, sanction the creation of a 
Kurdish state, and strengthen the resolve of Kurdish nationalists in Turkey. Post-2003, 
Turkey saw an increase in PKK militants crossing the Iraqi-Turkish border and the 
number of weapons and explosives smuggled due to the crumbling political infrastructure 
in post-Hussein Iraq. Commander of the Turkish land forces, General Yaşar Büyükanıt, 
claimed that in 2005 there was the same number of PKK militants in Turkey as there had 
been at the time of Öcalan‘s arrest.346 Turkey also feared that American reliance on Iraqi 
Kurds would legitimize their quest for an independent state that would spur domestic 
secessionist movements. Turkish mistrust grew after the ―Suleimaniya‖ incident where 
U.S. troops detained and hooded Turkish Special Forces soldiers in Iraq based on faulty 
intelligence reports.347 Turkish policymakers pointed to American inability to prevent the 
activities of Kurdish militants in northern Iraq as Western unwillingness to fully combat 
the PKK in the global war on terror. American policymakers defended their 
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unwillingness to target the PKK on the grounds that the PKK does not directly threaten 
U.S. interests.348 Turks, however, use rhetoric of the ―U.S.‖ war on terror to fuel for 
conspiracy theories based on historic U.S. support for an independent Kurdish state.349 
As American forces left Iraq in 2011 and Iraq is consumed by Islamic militant groups, 
Turkey fears that Iraq will be unable to consolidate and assert its sovereignty, allowing 
space for Kurdish nationalism and greater autonomy. 
E. CONCLUSION 
A true analysis of Turkey‘s experience with twenty-first century terrorism cannot 
be fully presented with fresh developments emerging daily. As seen with the Islamic 
State, the transfer of territorial control is ongoing, alliances remain fluid, unintended 
consequences are still emerging, and Turkish perceptions are in limbo. PKK violence also 
continues with Kurdish groups taking advantage of the governance void in Syria and Iraq 
to establish strongholds. As PKK commits attacks in spite of the March 2013 ceasefire, 
the stakes rise for Ankara to secure lasting peace. Stalled diplomatic efforts increase the 
likelihood that the Turkish government will resort to deterrent counterterrorism policies 
rooted in early Republican perceptions of Kurdish revolts. The global war on terror also 
continues, with Turkey growing increasingly skeptical of Western commitments to 
combating terrorism that are incongruent with Turkish expectations. While none of these 
issues are fully resolved, the perceptions and rhetoric expressed by Turkish policymakers 
and commentators as these events unfold can be contextualized within the anxieties and 
perceptions that historically categorize terrorism within Turkey. The references to late 
Ottoman and early Republican views of nationalism and separatism illustrates that these 
experiences remain relevant and influence the reactions and responses to terrorism within 
Turkey and at its borders. 
Although the terrorism threat from Syria still aggravates the Sèvres Syndrome, 
evidence exists that Turkish policymakers can overcome the tendency to perceive 
terrorism through the historical lens. One important sign that Turkey has moved away 
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from voraciously defending its borders is the cultivation of economic and diplomatic 
spheres of influence. Turkey sends an estimated $12 billion in annual exports to Iraq and 
Iraqi Kurdistan, providing an economic incentive to maintain relations and minimize 
disruptions from the Islamic State or Kurdish militants.350 Further, Turkey has opened 
negotiations directly with Iraq‘s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) on an energy 
pipeline deal. Although no similar autonomous Kurdish government exists in Syria, this 
could serve as a template for relations with Syria‘s Kurds that focus more on shared 
economic interests than resolved historic territorial disputes. Some scholars have gone as 
far to connect these actions to a veiled attempt by Turkish policymakers to take 
advantage of the opportunity to ―overthrow‖ the Sykes-Picot order, viewing these 
policies as a continuation of the Sèvres Syndrome.351 Still, the economic linkages can 
help temper policymakers‘ perceptions and reduce the sustainability of the Sèvres 
Syndrome. In an environment with ongoing peace talks with the PKK and increased 
focus on diplomatic solutions, there is hope that pragmatism, not historic anxieties, can 
dominate. 
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This thesis makes three assertions regarding the historical roots of terrorism 
within Turkey. First, I argue that Turkey‘s perceptions of terrorism are shaped by its 
historical experience of territorial loss and separatism embodied by the terms of the 
Treaty of Sèvres. Instead of delegating the treaty to a historical nuance that was 
superseded by a more favorable outcome, its emergence during the republic‘s formative 
years had a profound psychological impact on early Turkish leaders. These perceptions 
persist and have influenced multiple Turkish foreign policy decisions and reactions to 
territorial questions, developing into the ―Sèvres Syndrome‖ featuring fear of territorial 
dismemberment and Western intervention in domestic affairs. Second, these late Ottoman 
and early Republican perceptions of irredentism and imperialism remained relevant and 
shaped policymakers‘ reactions to ASALA and PKK terrorism of the 1970s, 1980s, and 
1990s. Third, perceptions of terrorism remain rooted in the historical interpretations of 
dissent, nationalism, and separatism even as religiously-motivated terrorism from 
Kurdish Hizbollah, İBDA-C, al-Qaeda, and Islamic State gains prominence within 
Turkey.  
This thesis places strong emphasis on rhetoric from Turkish politicians, 
parliamentarians, military leadership, media commentators, and security analysts in order 
to construct a narrative on Turkish perceptions of different types of terrorism from the 
1970s onward. While focused mainly on Turkish policymakers‘ reactions through 
counterterrorism policies, future research should be devoted to the broader implications 
of the Sèvres Syndrome on Turkey‘s foreign policy. Turkey‘s choices of counterterrorism 
policies impact its foreign policy with Iraq, Syria, Armenia, the United States, European 
states, and others. Future research can also focus on contextualizing the Islamic State and 
religiously-motivated terrorism within Turkey as time from the events provides the space 
for more critical analysis. 
There are significant implications of the historical framing on Turkey‘s ability to 
transcend terrorism. The Sèvres Syndrome has become ingrained in the political and 
social consciousness of Turkish policymakers, making repressive military 
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counterterrorism responses the first resort. Instead of evaluating the threat from each 
terrorist group within the contemporary realities, there is instead an imagined permanent 
threat of dismemberment. As Turkey strives to resolve the Kurdish issue in Turkey, 
instances of PKK violence continues to undermine Turkish efforts and has a negative 
effect on the Kurdish peace process in Turkey. If Turkey is perceived as not being serious 
to dismantling the Islamic State within its borders and Islamic State attacks on Kurds 
continue, this could ruin any gains made in the peace process.352 This thesis illustrates 
that the Sèvres Syndrome is the basis of Turkish policymakers‘ reactions and operates as 
the critical variable preventing Turkey from fully eliminating PKK violence within its 
borders. 
The Sèvres Syndrome also continues to undermine the relationship between 
minority communities within Turkey and the state. Original interpretations of Turkish 
nationalism and identity were based on territory and a common history, but the added 
ethnic nature evolved and was perceived to threaten the unity of fledging state from 
inside its borders. Early leaders connected minority groups to separatism based on the 
Treaty of Sèvres, and ironically, contemporary leaders retain this relevance. Turkey 
continues to reference Sèvres as it redefines and reconstructs its social identity even 
though it is a century removed from the end of World War I and assuming its role as an 
aspiring regional leader. The inability to reconcile cultural rights for domestic minorities, 
Turkish perceptions of a unitary state, and separatist violence has also left Turkey‘s 
accession process to the European Union at a stalemate.  
There are grounds for optimism that Turkey will be able to overcome the Sèvres 
Syndrome. However, some scholars contend that once ethnicity-based conflict arises, it 
initiates a cycle that is difficult to stop or reverse due to the reciprocal forces of 
violence.353 These forces would be difficult to oppose alone; Turkey has the added task 
of overcoming its historical legacy after years of this violence and politicization. Due to 
the Syndrome‘s pervasiveness in Turkish society, the basis of any lasting peace process 
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must conquer these widely accepted and ingrained historical anxieties. One Turkish 
journalist argues that ―in order to ‗sell‘ any peace model to the Turkish people, the 
government must persuade the people that a solution will not be the beginning of a 
disintegration process for Turkey.‖354 One step in the right direction is that both Öcalan 
and AKP leaders have begun to frame territorial issues within a new lexicon of a ―greater 
Turkey‖; this expansion would encompass more of the land initially envisioned by the 
National Pact. This would be a win-win situation for both parties; the Kurds would gain 
their rights and Turkey would expand its borders and gain a larger leadership role in the 
region.355 While this is a ―sellable‖ solution to overcome Turkey‘s Sèvres Syndrome, the 
likelihood is very low since Turkey‘s gain would encroach on the territorial sovereignty 
of its neighbors.  
It is unlikely that the role of Sèvres will diminish in the near future; instead, 
Turkish policymakers must recognize that the Sèvres Syndrome is a cognitive 
predisposition when surveying contemporary security threats. The lens of Sèvres limits 
the suite of options Turkish policymakers consider as political and cultural rights are 
inherently viewed as concessions that threaten the unity and cohesion of the state. These 
views also undermine Turkish counterterrorism policies as responses to regional 
developments remain predicated on the desire to counter groups allied with Kurds and 
separatist groups rather than the group that inflict the most damage on Turkish 
interests.356 Only by transcending these anxieties and forceful assertions of sovereignty 
can Turkey achieve peace with its minority groups and implement a balanced domestic 
and foreign policy. The potency of religiously-motivated terrorism in the region is 
unlikely to change in the near future; Turkey policymakers instead have the power of 
choice. 
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